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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from an Order granting Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding. 
Pursuant to notice dated February 2, 1994, the Utah 
Supreme Court has directed that the instant appeal be poured over 
to the Utah Court of Appeals for determination. R. 167-68. By 
notice dated March 10, 1994, the Utah Court of Appeals has directed 
that further proceedings by handled by the Utah Court of Appeals. 
R. 169. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES/STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellee disagrees with appellant's framing of the issues 
in this case. The issue in this case is whether the trial court 
correctly ruled, as a matter of law, that Phoenix Indemnity's 
policy of automobile insurance issued to Justin Bell on July 29, 
1991, was in full force and effect on August 11, 1991, the date of 
Justin Bell's fatal automobile accident, in light of the fact that 
Phoenix Indemnity failed to properly cancel the policy for non-
payment of premium as required under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-
303(2)(c). 
Appellant failed to comply with Rule 24(b) (5) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure by failing to provide the applicable 
standard of review and supporting authority for each issue he seeks 
to appeal. For the Court's benefit, the standard of review 
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pertaining to summary judgments has been clearly stated. Summary 
judgments present for review conclusions of law only, because, by 
definition, summary judgments do not resolve factual issues. 
Gridley Assoc. Ltd. V. Transamerica Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 524, 526 
(Utah App. 1992) ; Transamerica Cash Reserve, inc. v. Dixie Power & 
Water. Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 1990); Bonham v. Morgan. 788 
P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989). This court should afford no deference 
to the trial court, but review its conclusions for correctness 
only. Hiaains v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993); 
Alf v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.. 850 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Utah 
1993); Goetz v. American Reliable Ins. Co.. 844 P.2d 366, 368 (Utah 
App. 1992); Allen v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co.. 839 P.2d 
798, 800 (Utah 1992). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
The determinative statute in resolving this appeal is 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-303 (Supp. 1993), which states in pertinent 
part: 
(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided in this 
section , in other statutes, or by rule under 
Subsection (1) (c) , this section applies to all 
policies of insurance other than life and 
disability insurance and annuities, if they 
are issued on forms which are subject to 
filing and approval under Subsection 31A-21-
201(1). 
(b) A policy may provide terms more 
favorable to insureds than this section 
requires . . . 
* * * 
(2) (c) Subsections (2) (a) and (b) do not 
apply to any insurance contract that has not 
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been previously renewed if tlle contract has 
been in effect less than 60 days when the 
notice of cancellation is mailed or delivered. 
No cancellation under this subsection is 
effective until at least ten days after the 
delivery to the insured of a written notice of 
cancellation. If the notice is sent by first 
class mail, postage prepaid, to the insured at 
his last known address, delivery is considered 
accomplished after the passing, since the 
mailing date, of the mailing time specified in 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure . . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
issue of whether or • Just.in bell naa insurance coverage which 
was i n full force •• effect August *•• Jjf~* * the 
c :I 
as result ; ijurie- receiver subject automobile 
accident. t iqation was commenced he ^tate -^ ^a1if^v"* - *•*/ 
there is a personal injury protection death benefit irvi medical 
benefit <-**'~ -*<= \;e\ { i^ potential additional first-party claims 
pe Insurance Company t2 heirs 
and/or estate or Justin hui.. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
11 i : • e :i : t : a i i i • : f appellee's statements, Phoenix ^.naemnity 
purports to explaii ) i n summary form, ttu< positions of the parties. 
To t~H^ extent the summary is argumenta* r 
exp^ .. ^arti^' positions, appellant ^ojects thereto ie 
record speaks tor itself. 
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1. On September 30, 1991, Phoenix Indemnity Insurance 
Company filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment. R. 2-6. 
2. On April 20, 1992, the estate of Justin Bell filed 
an Answer to Phoenix Indemnity's Complaint. R. 9-15. 
3. On March 2, 1993, the Third Judicial District Court, 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, by its own motion entered an order to 
show cause why this case should not be dismissed for failure to 
prosecute. R. 21. 
4. On March 29, 1993, a hearing was held before the 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson wherein both parties stipulated that 
they would file cross motions for summary judgment or certify the 
case for trial. R. 23. 
5. On August 19, 1993, the estate of Justin Bell filed 
a Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment claiming that, as a matter of law, Phoenix 
Indemnity's policy of insurance issued to Justin Bell was in full 
force and effect on the date of the accident, and seeking a 
declaratory judgment so holding. R. 29-30 and 36-78. 
6. On August 31, 1993, Phoenix Indemnity filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Authorities in Support of 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to the 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, claiming that no insurance 
coverage was in effect, and seeking a declaratory judgment so 
holding. R. 81-122. 
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7. On October , the estate of Justin Bell filed 
Defendarf' Reply Memorandum Support of ^efendar*' Motion for 
Summary Judgmen *• .25-136. 
8. - r ovember -tu„_,, ndemnity filed a Reply 
Memorandum Suppor .^,,L. .^.L.^ . wi Summary Judgment 
ir^  f Opposition to Defendant's Motion fci Summary Judgment. 
U9-x46 . 
9. , December =* narties argued their 
respective motions before the Honorable Timoth Hanson, who 
issued a minute err * - . - * 4" • r 
Summary Judgment and denying piaintiir . >.. , 
of said Minute Entry is attached hereto as Appendi; -^py of 
hereto1 as Appendix . 
1 0 ' i January • an ;rde. Findings and Summary 
f 
Def endar .53-LD6. n op ,J . order, rxnumgs and 
Summary Judgment is attached hereto as Appendix C) 
11. a 
Notice of Appea±. . D^-OV riioenix inaemnny's 
Notice of Appeal is attached hereto as Appendix D) 
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C. Statement of the Facts, 
1. On or about July 10, 1991, the decedent, Justin 
Bell, applied for a policy of insurance with Phoenix Indemnity 
Insurance Company, through the independent insurance agency, Lyons 
& Associates. R. 32. 
2. The policy of insurance applied for with Phoenix 
Indemnity Insurance Company included liability and personal injury 
protection coverage in the minimum amounts required by the laws of 
the State of Utah, as well car damage other than collision, and 
collision damage, with Two Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($250.00) 
deductibles each. R. 32. 
3. In applying for insurance with Phoenix Indemnity, 
Justin Bell signed an application for insurance. R. 33. (A copy of 
the insurance application is attached hereto as Appendix E) 
4. The application of insurance contained a paragraph 
immediately above the signature line on the second page which 
states: 
I understand that no coverage is bound earlier 
than the time and date the application is 
signed. I also understand and agree that it 
may be necessary to adjust the premium and/or 
the term of my policy to conform to the 
company's filed rates if any information is 
found to be incorrect. I also agree that if 
my premium payment is not honored by the bank, 
no coverage will be considered bound. I 
hereby acknowledge that I received a copy of 
this application. 
R. 32-33. 
5. At the time Justin Bell signed his application ne 
i O 
Phoenix Indemnity iio^.ot iraw Zions First 
National Bank. 
6. s 
$164.00 chr^1' • premium payment, to ne Piiuemx Indemnity 
Insurance Company i n Phoenix, Ari zona, where ** >r-r «^ation was 
• s $11; 6 1 C !3 • : .1 i = :: II :  ; a , s • :J =ij • , • , 
M&I i i iunderbird Bank, 9050 North 1.9th Avenut- Phoenix, Arizona, on 
• J : - J - J u l y ^ -i ; 
7. d 
Bell 's check "" ;• ,•. -::.:n r i i,e B e h s account had a 
balance * •' 1 r^ v • T- • ' - Wa'ilr stamped the 
i • I 
Thunderbird Bam:, P n o e m x Indemnity ir.--.ui .r\:o Compan : ' ;:an^  n 
Phoenix, Arizona ' **. 
8 . I . •.. A a n k received and ;....J s t e d 1:1 l e c h e c k 
as : -eturned item - •* same date, M&I 
rpvnjnM^v-wi
 r,« Bank mailed a statement to Phco^ix Indemnity Insurance 
' . - e returned che^;.. rnceni.. .ruer... . y 
received nut: * . - i.e check was returned without payment :\ uly 
29, 1991, CLZ> a Monday J J - J H . 
9. Tnere were ^ u m c i e n t f«. .. -.- s 
checking accc:,, * .*,:.,:•'.. . /9 . i - igust l, 
1991 to cover m e - ; a 
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the account to cover the check after August 1, 1991. Phoenix 
Indemnity did not ever resubmit the check for payment. R. 34. 
10. On July 29, 1991, Phoenix Indemnity Insurance 
Company issued the written insurance policy for and on behalf of 
Justin Bell for the coverage he applied for on July 10, 1991. R. 
34. (A copy of the policy is attached hereto as Appendix F) 
11. On August 7, 1991, a notice of cancellation or non-
renewal of insurance policy was mailed to Justin Bell, indicating 
that the policy had been canceled retroactive as to July 10, 1991. 
R. 34. (A copy of the cancellation or non-renewal is attached 
hereto as Appendix G) 
12. The notice of cancellation or non-renewal stated 
that the reason for cancellation/non-renewal was "NSF check - not 
honored by bank." R. 34. 
13. Justin Bell left Salt Lake for California on August 
11, 1991. R. 133. 
14. On August 11, 1991, the decedent, Justin Bell, was 
involved in an automobile accident in Norwalk, Los Angeles County, 
California. R. 34. 
15. The formal insurance policy issued to decedent on 
July 29, 1991, provided for cancellation of the insurance policy as 
follows: 
We may cancel this policy by mailing notice of 
cancellation to you at least 30 days before 
the cancellation takes effect. Our 
cancellation must be by certified or first 
class mail. 
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If notice is mailed within the first 60 days 
the policy is in effect, and this is not a 
renewal policy, or if cancellation if for 
nonpayment of premium, we will provide you at 
least 10 days' notice. 
R. 34-35. 
16. Litigation has been commenced in the State of 
California by claimants against the estate of Justin Bell, and 
also, there is a potential personal injury protection death benefit 
and medical benefit claim, as well as potential additional first-
party claims pending against Phoenix Indemnity Insurance Company by 
the heirs and/or estate of Justin Bell. R. 35. 
17. In addition to the foregoing facts to which the 
parties have stipulated, it is also clear that the policy issued by 
Phoenix Indemnity to Justin Bell was countersigned by a Phoenix 
Indemnity authorized representative on August 1, 1991. R. 128. (A 
copy of the Declaration Sheet is attached hereto as Appendix H) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Phoenix Indemnity's U.C.C. arguments were not raised in 
the trial court and, therefore, cannot be raised for the first time 
on appeal. Moreover, Insurance Code § 31A-21-303 specifically 
applies to this case and takes priority over any more general 
U.C.C. statute. 
Phoenix Indemnity accepted Justin Bell's check as a 
promise to pay and in consideration thereof issued a policy of 
insurance. The policy of insurance contains no language regarding 
conditional payment of premiums. Once the policy was issued any 
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language in the application was no longer controlling and the 
policy was in full force and effect at the time of Justin Bell's 
accident. 
Phoenix Indemnity is barred by its own actions of issuing 
a policy on the same day it received notice of the check's 
dishonor, and countersigning the policy three days later, from 
claiming now that the policy never existed. Phoenix Indemnity 
accepted Justin Bell's check (promise to pay) and subsequently 
issued a policy. It was not until nine days after Phoenix 
Indemnity received notice of the check's dishonor, and three weeks 
after Justin Bell had given the check to his insurance agent, that 
Phoenix Indemnity attempted to provide any notice of cancellation. 
Justin Bell was on his trip to California when the notice was 
mailed. It was during this trip that he suffered his fatal 
accident. 
Because a contract of insurance existed between the 
parties, Phoenix Indemnity was compelled to follow the cancellation 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-303 (2) (c) and the language 
of its own policy. Both provisions are essentially the same. The 
cancellation requirements do not provide for retroactive cancella-
tion. When a policy is in force for less than 60 days, as in the 
instant case, the insurer must provide the insured at least 10 
days' notice prior to cancellation for failure to pay premiums. 
Following this rule, Justin Bell's policy of insurance could not 
have been canceled prior to August 20, 1991, several days after the 
10 
date of the subject accident. Because the policy was in full force 
and effect at the date of the subject accident, Phoenix Indemnity 
should be required to provide the coverage outlined in that policy. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. MATTERS NOT RAISED AT TRIAL LEVEL 
CANNOT BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL 
In its brief, Phoenix Indemnity identified two Uniform 
Commercial Code provisions, Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-3-511(3) and 70A-
3-802, in support of its position that Justin Bell's check was 
conditional payment. However, the only statute at issue, and the 
only statute raised in the trial court, was Utah Code Ann. § 31A-
21-303 within the Insurance Code. Statutes relating to a specific 
subject should be given preference over those dealing more 
generally with the subject. See State v. Vigil, 842 P. 2d 843 (Utah 
1992); State v. Bagshaw, 836 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1992); Flovd v. 
Western Surgical Assoc, Inc., 773 P.2d 401 (Utah App. 1989); 
Cannon v. Gardner, 611 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1980). Section 31A-21-303 
is specific to the issues in this case and takes precedence over 
the U.C.C. provisions. 
Additionally, it is widely held that matters, including 
defenses and claims, not raised at the trial court level will not 
be considered for the first time on appeal. Lane v. Messer, 731 
P.2d 488 (Utah 1986); Bundy v. Century Eguip. Co., Inc., 692 P.2d 
754 (Utah 1984); Travner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984); 
Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983). See Inslev Mfg. 
Corp. v. Draper Bank and Trust, 717 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1986) (bank 
11 
could not raise issue of whether it was holder in due course of 
check deposited in debtor's account for first time on appeal); 
Valley Bank and Trust Co. v. Wilken. 668 P.2d 493 (Utah 1983) 
(debtor could not raise failure of consideration on appeal when not 
brought before trial court). Appellant's assertions that the 
above-referenced U.C.C. statutes apply to this action were never 
raised at the trial court level. These matters are additional 
defenses and matters which should not now be considered for the 
first time on appeal. 
POINT II. PHOENIX INDEMNITY ISSUED AND 
COUNTERSIGNED A POLICY OF INSURANCE 
WHICH DID NOT CONTAIN A "CONDITIONAL 
PAYMENT" PROVISION. 
A. Policy of insurance issued to Justin Bell was not 
conditional upon subsequent honor of the check. 
By issuing and countersigning a policy of insurance to 
Justin Bell without a ''conditional payment" provision, Phoenix 
Indemnity has either waived its right to, or is estopped from, 
retroactively canceling the policy. Phoenix Indemnity cites as the 
general rule that "acceptance of a check as payment is that a check 
is conditionally accepted until it is properly presented and 
subsequently honored by the bank." (Brief of the Appellant, p. 
10). Appellee asserts that there are exceptions to the "general" 
rule as stated by appellant. 
In Cullotta v. Kemper Corp., 78 111.2d 25, 397 N.E.2d 
1372 (1979), the Illinois Supreme Court reversed summary judgment 
in favor of the insurer on a coverage issue involving the dishonor 
12 
of a premium check paid for renewal of an automobile insurance 
policy. Although the court recognized that payment by check is 
typically conditional, it stated that "it is clear that the rule 
may be altered by the express or implied intentions of the 
parties." Cullotta. 397 N.E.2d at 1374. The court further noted 
that, 
Of those jurisdictions which have passed upon 
the effect of a dishonored check as payment 
for insurance premium, the majority have found 
that, under proper circumstances a check may 
act as absolute satisfaction despite the fact 
the check is later dishonored . . . [0]nce the 
insurer accepts the check without evidencing 
an intent to do so conditionally it can no 
longer exercise its right to declare the 
policy lapsed due to nonpayment, even though 
the check is later dishonored. 
Id. at 1374-1375. In Cullotta. the policy was issued before the 
insurer knew the check was dishonored. The Court nonetheless 
reversed summary judgment for the insurer. The Court reasoned: 
In the case at bar, the renewal policy of 
insurance, issued without conditional 
language, is . equivalent to a receipt 
and, therefore, raised the presumption that 
the check was taken in absolute payment of the 
premium. 
Id. at 1376. (emphasis added) The Cullotta Court found it 
important that the insured had sufficient funds in his checking 
account to cover the check when it was drawn and for several days 
thereafter. Cullotta concluded with the following statement: 
Insurance, and particularly automobile 
coverage, now plays a critical role in 
society. Countless numbers of persons who 
have been injured in collisions would be 
dependent upon public aid were it not for the 
13 
financial protection afforded by the insurance 
industry. Therefore, "[f]orfeiture of an 
insurance contract for non-payment of premium 
is not favored in the law, and courts are 
prompt to seize upon circumstances which 
indicate a waiver of forfeiture.11 
Id. at 1376. As stated in Cullotta, a check can be absolute 
satisfaction despite the fact that it is later dishonored. Phoenix 
Indemnity did not evidence any intent to accept the check 
conditionally. In fact, Phoenix Indemnity issued the policy of 
insurance to Justin Bell on the same day which it received the 
notice of dishonor from Zions Bank. Three days later, Phoenix 
Indemnity's authorized representative countersigned the policy. 
Like Cullotta, the Phoenix Indemnity policy did not contain any 
conditional payment language. Also, like Cullotta, Justin Bell had 
sufficient funds in his account on several days before the policy 
was canceled. Also, Phoenix Indemnity failed to serve Justin Bell 
with notice of cancellation until some nine days after it was aware 
the check had been dishonored. These facts support the view that 
payment was not conditional. 
The Cullotta court relied on Bartleman v. Humphrey, 441 
S.W.2d 335 (Mo. 1969). In Bartleman, the Supreme Court of Missouri 
affirmed a judgment for the judgment creditor, finding that the 
policy at issue was in force and had not lapsed. Mrs. Humphrey 
went to an insurance agent to apply for automobile insurance 
coverage. She completed an application and attached a check for 
the premium payment. The binder portion of the application 
provided for the binder to be void if any check tendered in payment 
14 
of premium was not honored. On November 29, I960, Mrs, Humphrey 
gave the agent a check for $11.45. 
The insurance company issued a policy on December 9, 
I960, with the period of coverage to be from November 29, 1960 
through February 29, 1961. This policy was mailed to the Humphreys 
on December 13, 1960. On the same day, December 13, the insurer 
deposited the Humphreys' check. 
Mrs. Humphrey's check was returned twice for insufficient 
funds. Both instances occurred after the policy had already been 
issued. By a letter dated December 27, 1960, the insurer sent the 
Humphreys notice that their policy had lapsed due to insufficient 
funds. The insurer subsequently denied coverage on an accident 
which occurred after the dishonor of the check, claiming that the 
policy lapsed due to nonpayment of premium. 
In finding that the policy was in full force and effect, 
the court in Bartleman emphasized that the policy at issue did not 
contain the language of the binder, i.e., that it was effective 
only upon the condition that the premium was paid. In the policy's 
recital, the following statement was contained: 
In reliance upon the Declarations . . . and 
for payment of the premium . . . . 
Bartleman, 441 S.W.2d at 340. Without the conditional payment 
language, the insurer could only cancel the policy upon giving 
written notice to the insured not less that ten days prior to the 
effective date of cancellation. 
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The issuance of the December 9 policy and delivery on 
December 13 consummated the contract of liability insurance. Id. 
at 343. The court reasoned: 
That policy, by its provisions, embodied the 
entire agreement between these parties and it 
contained no condition such as effectiveness 
only if the premium is paid or if a check is 
honored. 
Id. The policy was without conditions. In order to have avoided 
enforcement of the policy, the insurer could have presented the 
check immediately and withheld the policy until the check cleared. 
All action by the insurer was done as though a cash premium had 
been paid. Under these circumstances, "the policy was the 
equivalent of an unconditional receipt . . . thereby placing 
insurance in force . . . .,f Id. at 344. Additionally, the letter 
from the insurance company of December 27 referred to the policy 
lapsing. This lapse, explained the court, infers that there was a 
policy in force. "[A] policy could lapse only if once in force." 
Id. at 343. 
Bartleman is supportive of appellee's position. Like 
Bartleman, only the Phoenix Indemnity binder application contained 
conditional language. The policy itself contained no such 
language. The policy contained only language referring to coverage 
"in return for your premium payment." As emphasized in Bartleman, 
this is not conditional language. Without conditional language, 
cancellation can only be effected by proper notice. Once the 
policy is issued, any conditional language in an application or 
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binder is no longer controlling. The policy itself controls. In 
Bartleman, this notice was 10 days prior to the effective cancella-
tion, just like the notice provided for in Phoenix Indemnity's 
policy. Of substantial significance is the fact that a policy 
cannot lapse, or in Justin Bell's case, be canceled, unless it was 
once in existence. The fact that Phoenix Indemnity sent to Justin 
Bell a notice of cancellation supports the fact that the policy 
existed. 
Although appellant cites Statewide Ins. Corp. v. Dewar, 
143 Ariz. 576, 694 P.2d 1190 (1983), in support of the general 
rule, appellant failed to inform this court that the Supreme Court 
of Arizona vacated the Dewar decision. Statewide Ins. Corp. v. 
Dewar, 143 Ariz. 553, 694 P.2d 1167 (1984). In Dewar, Mr. Desotell 
applied for an automobile insurance policy and paid his first 
premium by check. The bank dishonored Desotell's check and 
returned it to Statewide with the notation "uncollected funds.11 
Statewide sent Desotell notice of the check's dishonor. However, 
prior to receiving this notice, Desotell was involved in an 
accident. 
The Supreme Court of Arizona, citing both Cullotta and 
Bartleman, held that because the binder application did not have 
any conditional payment language, the notice of rejection or 
refusal was effective only upon receipt by the insured. Id. at 
1173. As reasoned by the court: 
Any other rule would either leave the insurer 
with an unacceptable risk . . . or leave the 
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expectant insured unaware that his application 
has been rejected and that he is driving while 
uninsured. 
Id. Because Desotell had not received notice that his application 
had been rejected, the binder was still in effect at the time of 
the accident. Upon dishonor of Desotell's check, Statewide had 
several options: 
First, it could have presented the check again 
for payment; second, it could have proceeded 
to issue the policy and enforced the insured's 
promise to pay by action on the check. 
Id. at 1172. Dewar is similar to the instant case in that Justin 
Bell did not receive notice that he did not have insurance coverage 
due to the dishonor of his check before he was involved in the 
subject accident. Appellant supports this fact in its brief. (See 
Brief of Appellant at p. 14-15) 
Also like Dewar, Phoenix Indemnity issued a policy which 
did not contain any conditional payment language. As stated by the 
court in Dewar, if the insurer intended to make the policy 
conditional, it could have provided for some condition. Id. at 
1171. Additionally, Phoenix Indemnity had the same options—it 
could have resubmitted the check for payment. Phoenix Indemnity 
did not choose to do this. Instead, Phoenix Indemnity chose to 
issue a policy of insurance to Justin Bell. Once the policy was 
issued, Phoenix Indemnity's action was limited to an action on the 
check. Because Justin Bell did not receive notice of cancellation 
prior to the subject accident, the policy issued by Phoenix 
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Indemnity remained in full force and effect until proper notice had 
been achieved several days later. 
Tallent v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins,, 785 S.W.2d 339 
(Tenn. 1990), cited by appellant, acknowledges that "issuance of a 
policy • • . by an insurance company may be circumstances against 
the presumption of conditional payment . . . ." Tallent, 785 
S.W.2d at 344. Tallent involved a renewal premium payment and is 
factually different than the instant case for one important 
reasons. The record in Tallent showed conclusively that, 
Plaintiff did not on the date when she issued 
the check or at any time thereafter have as 
much as $299.00, the amount of the premium, on 
deposit in her checking account. She knew or 
must be charged with knowing that the check 
could not have been honored upon presentation 
to the drawee bank, (emphasis added) 
Tallent, 785 S.W.2d at 341. The Supreme Court of Tennessee 
supported it decision with the following comment: 
The check was not good when issued nor was it 
good at any time thereafter, including the 
date of the fire loss. 
Id. at 342-43. The court in Tallent found for the insurer chiefly 
because the insured never had sufficient funds in the bank to cover 
the check. 
Unlike Tallent. Justin Bell did not give Phoenix 
Indemnity a "bad" check. Justin Bell had sufficient funds in his 
account on several days before the August 7 notice of cancellation 
was sent. In Tallent. the insured never had sufficient funds in 
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her account to cover the premium payment. Such was not the case in 
the instant matter. 
Phoenix Indemnity treated the check as cash payment 
because it proceeded to issue the policy on July 29, 1991, without 
the conditional payment language found in the application. This 
fact raises the presumption of absolute payment as described in 
Cullotta. Phoenix Indemnity knew the check had been dishonored, 
but nonetheless issued and countersigned the policy. Phoenix 
Indemnity's intent is clear—it intended to accept Justin Bell's 
check without condition. For this reason, the policy was in full 
force and effect on the date of the subject accident, 
B. Phoenix Indemnity is barred by the theory of 
estoppel and waiver. 
An insurance company can by its own conduct waive or be 
estopped from relying on the conditional payment rule. The 
elements of estoppel have been clearly defined by the Utah courts. 
Estoppel requires proof of three elements: 
(i) a statement, admission, act, or failure to 
act by one party inconsistent with a claim 
later asserted; (ii) reasonable action or 
inaction by the other party taken or not taken 
on the basis of the first party's statement, 
admission, act, or failure to act; and (iii) 
injury to the second party that would result 
from allowing the first party to contradict or 
repudiate such statement, admission, act, or 
failure to act. 
CECO v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah 
1989) . See also Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 688 
(Utah 1985) ; United American Life Ins. Co. v. Zions First Nat. 
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Bank, 641 P.2d 158 (Utah 1982); Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement 
Bd.. 795 P.2d 671 (Utah App. 1990). 
In Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Davis, 151 111. App. 3d 
929, 503 N.E.2d 565 (111. App. 2 Dist. 1987) cert. den. 511 N.E.2d 
427 (1987) , the court held as a matter of law, that the insurer had 
"waived its right to declare the policy lapsed for nonpayment of 
the premium" where the premium check was dishonored. Even though 
the policy itself contained conditional payment language, the court 
concluded the insurer's actions constituted waiver. The court 
explained: 
Waiver which may be expressed or implied, may 
be found where the words or conduct of an 
insured are inconsistent with an intent to 
rely on the requirements of the policy. 
503 N.E.2d at 570. Appellee has provided proof and support for 
each element of estoppel. First, Phoenix Indemnity received notice 
of the check's dishonor on July 29, 1991. Despite having that 
notice, Phoenix Indemnity issued an insurance policy to Justin 
Bell. The policy was issued on the same date, July 29, 1991. 
Furthermore, the declaration sheet shows the policy as being 
countersigned by Phoenix Indemnity on August 1, 1991, three days 
after it received notice of dishonor. 
Phoenix Indemnity's actions are contradictory. On the 
one hand, it issued a policy of insurance to Justin Bell on the 
same day that notice of the check's dishonor was received and on 
the other hand, it tried to nullify that same policy for the reason 
that the check was dishonored. 
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Even after learning of the check's dishonor, Phoenix 
Indemnity nonetheless countersigned the policy and did nothing to 
promptly notify Justin Bell or his insurance agent that the check 
was dishonored. Phoenix Indemnity never resubmitted the check to 
Zions Bank for payment, nor even checked on the account's status. 
Had Phoenix Indemnity done so, at any time through August 1, the 
check would have cleared. 
Additionally, Phoenix Indemnity waited nine days after 
notice of dishonor before mailing notice of cancellation to Justin 
Bell. These acts and failures to act are inconsistent with Phoenix 
Indemnity's claim that coverage never existed. Why send a notice 
of cancellation if no policy was in existence? 
Had Justin Bell been notified by Phoenix Indemnity 
promptly of the check's dishonor, he could have deposited 
additional funds into his account before he left for California on 
August 8. 
Lastly, considerable injury will result to appellee if 
Phoenix Indemnity were allowed to contradict the policy's coverage. 
Justin Bell was involved in a fatal automobile accident just three 
days after Phoenix Indemnity mailed the notice to him. Because he 
had already departed on his trip, he never received that notice. 
Phoenix Indemnity should be required to follow the notice 
provisions in section 31A-21-303(2)(c) and its own policy, 
requiring 10 days' notice prior to any cancellation. 
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Additionally, Phoenix Indemnity's inconsistent action and 
inaction in relation to this situation should not now be used to 
justify that the policy never existed. The policy did exist—it 
was issued to Justin Bell on July 29, 1991. Phoenix Indemnity's 
inconsistent conduct caused significant injury. There are 
outstanding claims being made against Justin Bell's estate, in 
addition to personal injury protection death benefits, medical 
benefits claims, and other first party claims pending against 
Phoenix Indemnity. 
Like the insured's in the cases cited, Justin Bell had 
adequate funds in his account on several occasions after the check 
was initially given as payment. Had Phoenix Indemnity resubmitted 
this check, it could have been honored. 
Appellant cited Hare v. Connecticut Hut. Life Ins. Co., 
173 S.E. 772 (W. Va. 1934), in support of its argument. This case, 
however, is distinguishable. In Hare, the insured made a payment 
on a life insurance policy. The insured's check was refused by the 
bank for insufficient funds. Within one week of the check's 
dishonor, the insured died and the plaintiff brought suit on the 
policy. The court reversed a judgment for the plaintiff and found 
that the insurance company was not liable under the policy. The 
court emphasized, however, that after the check's dishonor, the 
insurance agent "immediately wrote to the insured that the check 
had been protested.11 Hare, 173 S.E. at 773. Even in light of this 
notice, the insured did not take any action to make the check good. 
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Unlike Hare, Phoenix Indemnity did not "immediately" 
notify Justin Bell of the check's dishonor. Had Phoenix Indemnity 
notified Justin Bell that the check was returned to Phoenix, he 
could have made certain that the account was supplemented to cover 
the check before he left for California. Such was not the case in 
Hare where the insured did not even attempt to make the check good. 
Phoenix Indemnity either consciously waived the right to 
assert conditional payment or should be estopped from enforcing the 
conditional payment rule. Phoenix Indemnity waived this right to 
claim a forfeiture by issuing a policy without any forfeiture 
language after receiving notice of dishonor. Additionally, for the 
reasons set forth above, Phoenix Indemnity should be barred by the 
theory of estoppel from claiming now that Justin Bell's insurance 
policy never existed. 
Forfeiting an entire policy retroactively to the date of 
application on the basis of one sentence contained in an applica-
tion after the insurer has issued a policy that contains no such 
forfeiture provision, should not be allowed under the facts and 
circumstances of this case. It was almost a month after the date 
of the check before Phoenix indemnity mailed the notice of 
cancellation due to non-payment of premium. Even if this Court 
felt appellee's argument regarding waiver and estoppel could not be 
affirmed, as a matter of law, clearly these theories would preclude 
any judgment for Phoenix Indemnity because they would raise 
material issues of genuine fact. 
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POINT III. JUSTIN BELL GAVE PHOENIX INDEM-
NITY SUFFICIENT CONSIDERATION 
FOR THE POLICY OF INSURANCE. 
The applicant need not actually pay the insurer in order 
for the policy to be in full force and effect. As stated in 12 
A.L.R.3d 1304, 1318 (1967), Temporary Automobile Insurance Pending 
Issuance of Policy: 
Payment of the premium is not a prerequisite 
to a valid automobile insurance binder. An 
agreement to pay the premium, express or 
implied, is sufficient consideration . . . 
Appellant cited McCormick v. State Capital Life Ins. Co. . 
254 S.C. 544, 172 S.E.2d 308 (S.C. 1980), and an opinion from the 
Attorney General of the State of Utah, in support of his argument 
that because inadequate consideration was exchanged, the policy 
never went into effect. This case is distinguishable from the 
references above. 
First, the policy in McCormick was issued before the 
insurer knew the check bounced. That is not true in the instant 
action. The check was resubmitted and bounced a second time. The 
insurance agent gave the insured every opportunity to remedy the 
situation and the insured failed to do so. 
Additionally, in the Attorney General's statement, the 
conclusion reached was the following: 
Where an insurance contract is never completed 
because the initial premium was not paid, and 
the policy issued to the applicant states that 
the policy is valid only if the initial 
premium has been paid, the notice provisions . 
. . are inapplicable, (emphasis in original) 
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(See Attorney General's statement, Brief of Appellant, Appendix C) . 
This opinion has no relevance to the instant action. The case of 
which generated this opinion involved a policy which stated clearly 
and in bold type that the policy only took effect if the premium 
was actually paid. This language was one of conditional payment. 
Such conditional payment language is not present in the Phoenix 
Indemnity policy. It can reasonably be inferred from the absence 
of such conditional payment language and Phoenix Indemnity's 
actions that nothing more than possession of the premium payment 
(whether or not actual payment was realized) was all that was 
required to effectuate the policy. Since this was accomplished, 
the notice requirements remain applicable. Furthermore, the trial 
and appellate courts of this state establish and interpret the law, 
not an opinion letter from the Attorney General's office. 
Phoenix Indemnity's argument that no coverage ever 
existed because no consideration was paid is too broad and 
conflicts with the clear statutory notice requirements under U.C.A. 
§ 31A-21-303. This argument also conflicts with Phoenix 
Indemnity's Policy Endorsement requiring Phoenix Indemnity to give 
10 days' notice of cancellation due to non-payment of premiums. 
The statute and the policy provision clearly show that a policy can 
and must remain in force during the notice time frame even though 
no premium payment (no consideration) has been paid during that 
time frame. 
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Although, unfortunately, Justin Bell's checking account 
did not have sufficient funds to cover the $164 check on the date 
(July 18, 1991) it was initially presented to Zions First National 
Bank, his account did have sufficient funds on six subsequent days 
prior to the notice of cancellation. Additionally, Justin Bell's 
checking account had a $955.41 balance on July 12, and a $432.04 
balance on July 15, 1991 (two and five days, respectively, after 
Bell signed the insurance application). (A copy of Justin Bell's 
account summary is attached hereto as Appendix I) 
Justin Bell's check to Phoenix Indemnity was equivalent 
to his promise to pay. This was sufficient consideration to uphold 
the policy of insurance for which coverage was sought and which 
policy was actually issued. 
POINT IV. BECAUSE AN INSURANCE CONTRACT 
EXISTED BETWEEN PHOENIX INDEMNITY 
AND JUSTIN BELL, PHOENIX INDEMNITY 
WAS BOUND TO CANCEL THE POLICY IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH UTAH CODE ANN. § 
31A-21-303. 
The rule governing cancellation of an insurance policy is 
set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-303, which states, in part: 
(2) (c) . . . No cancellation under this 
subsection is effective until at least ten 
days after the delivery to the insured of a 
written notice of cancellation. If the notice 
is sent by first class mail, postage prepaid, 
to the insured at his last known address, 
delivery is considered accomplished after the 
passing, since the mailing date, of the 
mailing time specified in the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure . . . . 
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Subsection (1) of this statute makes it clear that this 
entire section applies to all insurance policies, except life and 
disability insurance and annuities and in certain other specific 
instances, none of which exceptions are applicable here. 
Subsection (1) also expresses an intent to maintain certain basic 
rights in favor of the insurer, not to narrow those rights. For 
example, subsection (1)(b) indicates that a policy may provide more 
favorable terms of the insured that are required by the statute. 
It does not say the insurance company can provide terms that are 
less favorable to the insured. 
In order to protect insureds from the uncertainty of 
knowing whether their payment has been properly received and 
credited, the statute requires the insurance company to give 
written 10-day notice prior to cancellation for failure to pay the 
premium. There is no justifiable reason why this notice provision 
should not apply to the initial premium payment when the statutory 
provision would clearly apply to any premium payments. The statute 
makes no differentiation between the first and subsequent premiums, 
because the purpose is the same, to protect the insured. 
Statutory notice provisions were intended to protect the 
insured from the uncertainty of whether a premium check had been 
properly received and credited. In addition, Phoenix Indemnity's 
policy issued to Justin Bell contains the very notice provisions 
required by section 31A-21-303. The endorsement, entitled "Utah 
Cancellation11, states, in relevant part: 
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We may cancel this policy by mailing notice of 
cancellation to you at least 3 0 days before 
the cancellation takes effect. Our 
cancellation must be by certified or first 
class mail. 
If notice is mailed within the first 60 days 
the policy is in effect, and this is not a 
renewal policy, or if cancellation is for non-
payment of premium, ve will promise vou at 
least 10 days7 notice. (emphasis added) 
In Godov v. Farmers Ins. Group, 759 P.2d 1173 (Utah App. 
1988), this Court reversed a summary judgment for the insurance 
company on the grounds that the company had not established that 
its notice of cancellation for non-payment of premium met the 10-
day requirement. This Court made the following statement: 
In order to cancel an insurance policy for 
non-payment of premium prior to the end of the 
policy's term, the insurer had to give the 
insured at least 10 days' notice, accompanied 
by the reason for the cancellation. (emphasis 
in original) 
Godoy, 759 P.2d at 1175. A genuine issue of material fact existed 
in Godov because it was unclear when the notice of cancellation was 
in fact mailed. No such confusion exists in the instant case. The 
notice of cancellation was mailed by Phoenix Indemnity on August 7, 
1991. This notice of cancellation purported to retroactively 
cancel the policy back to July 10, 1991. There was not even an 
attempt by Phoenix Indemnity to give the 10 days' notice. 
Haaerl v. Auto Club Group Ins. Co., 157 Mich. App. 683, 
403 N.W.2d 197 (1987), leave to appeal denied, 428 Mich. 900 
(1987), is also supportive of respondent's position. The trial 
court in Haaerl granted summary judgment in favor of the insured 
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finding coverage in force at the time of the accident. The trial 
court also found that the coverage could not be retroactively 
canceled, even though the insured's renewal premium check was 
dishonored by the bank and returned due to insufficient funds. 
Hagerl, 403 N.W.2d at 199. The trial court's decision was upheld 
on appeal. 
In Hagerl, the plaintiff had a contract of insurance 
through the defendant insurance company which was valid until March 
2, 1983. Prior to the policy expiration date, the insurance 
company offered the insured the chance to renew the policy and sent 
her a renewal package, which indicated that failure to pay the 
renewal premium meant that the renewal offer was being declined. 
The insured sent the defendant insurance company a check for the 
amount of the renewal premium. 
It was undisputed that the insured's check was 
subsequently dishonored by the bank for insufficient funds. After 
receiving the first notice of dishonor, the insurance company 
resubmitted the check for payment. The check was again dishonored 
for insufficient funds. On March 29, 1983, following the second 
dishonor, the insurer sent a notice of termination to the insured. 
The insured, on April 1, 1983, was involved in an accident. 
Despite the dishonored check, the court found that a 
valid contract of insurance existed and that coverage could not be 
denied. On this point, the court stated: 
The undisputed facts in this case indicate 
that plaintiff accepted defendant's renewal 
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offer and that she communicated her acceptance 
to defendant by mailing her check to the 
insurance company. Thus, a valid contract was 
formed . . . 
* * * 
We find unpersuasive defendant's argument that 
because plaintiff's check bounced she did not 
accept defendant's renewal offer. Defendant 
raises a technical argument based on the 
language of the previous insurance contract 
which stated: "Failure to pay the required 
renewal premium means that our offer to renew 
has been declined." . . . 
[T]he actual offer to renew was made when 
defendant sent plaintiff a renewal package. 
There is no evidence that anything in that 
renewal package, as opposed to the previous 
contract prescribed only one particular mode 
of acceptance for that package which would be 
acceptable to the defendant . . . . 
* * * 
The trial court correctly analyzed the 
cancellation issue and determined that 
defendant's March 29, 1983, notice could not 
retroactively terminate coverage before the 
date of accident. 
Id. at 197. Hagerl stands for the proposition that if the 
insurance company offers coverage in exchange for the premium 
check, they cannot retroactively cancel the policy if the check is 
returned for insufficient funds. 
The Court of Appeals of Michigan in Hagerl held the 
plaintiff accepted the insurer's offer of renewal when she sent in 
her check. By so doing, the policy was renewed and was in force on 
the date of the accident. Moreover, in order to effectively cancel 
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the policy, the insurance company was required to send out proper 
notice of cancellation which it failed to do. The court reasoned: 
The cancellation provisions of the previous 
policy were repeated in the new policy. Those 
provisions required notice of cancellation to 
be sent to the insured. The trial court 
correctly analyzed the cancellation issue and 
determined that defendant's March 29, 1983, 
notice could not retroactively terminate 
coverage before the date of the accident. 
Id. at 199. 
Like Hagerl, Phoenix Indemnity cannot retroactively 
cancel Justin Bell's policy due to insufficient funds. The 
contract of insurance was formed by Justin Bell's giving the 
premium check. The coverage offered in exchange for Justin Bell's 
premium was not conditional, as evidenced by the language of the 
policy. 
Although Phoenix Indemnity argues that the policy was not 
canceled because no policy ever existed, its own notice is entitled 
"Notice of Cancellation of Non-Renewal." This notice states, in 
part: 
You are notified that your automobile policy 
No. DBD51602 is hereby canceled . . . " 
(emphasis added) 
(Notice of Cancellation, attached hereto as Appendix G) . 
Additionally, Phoenix Indemnity stamped on the declaration sheet: 
"CANCELED . . . DATE CANCELED 7-10-91". (Declaration Sheet, 
attached hereto as Appendix H). Phoenix Indemnity admits by its 
own notice that the policy was canceled. In order to cancel such 
a policy, it must certainly have first been in existence. Notwith-
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standing the policy's existence, Phoenix Indemnity failed to comply 
with the statutory notice requirement to cancel. Like the 
situation in Bartleman, supra, Phoenix Indemnity could not cancel 
something unless it once existed. 
Phoenix Indemnity's own declaration sheet attached to the 
policy shows the policy term to run from July 10, 1991 to 12:01 
a.m. on September 11, 1991. Thus, the notice of cancellation 
requirement set forth in subsection (2)(c) applies to this policy. 
The notice of cancellation was mailed (delivered) on 
August 7, 1991. Clearly, the reason for cancellation was non-
payment of premium. As of the date the notice of cancellation was 
mailed, an actual written policy of insurance had been issued and 
was in force. Neither section 31A-21-303, nor the policy, provide 
for retroactive cancellation back to the date of the application 
once the policy has actually been issued. The provision in the 
application purports to allow a retroactive cancellation of the 
policy back to the date of application. This is contrary to the 
cancellation notice requirements of section 31A-21-303. The terms 
of the application attempt to narrow the insured's rights to notice 
of cancellation for non-payment of premium after a policy has been 
issued. This, as expressed by section 31A-21-303 (1), the insurance 
company cannot do. 
Once Phoenix Indemnity issued the policy for Justin Bell, 
it could only be canceled for non-payment of premium by a 10-day 
notice. Since the notice of cancellation was given by mail, an 
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additional three days must be added to the 10-day period. Thus, 
the cancellation could not become effective until at least August 
20, 1991, 13 days after the date of notice. It is clear that 
Phoenix Indemnity failed to give this notice. 
Both by statute and by its own policy endorsement, 
Phoenix Indemnity was required to give the 10-day notice of cancel-
lation in this case. Phoenix Indemnity should be required to meet 
the notice provisions of Utah's Insurance Code and its own policy. 
Because Phoenix Indemnity failed to effectively cancel the subject 
policy, it was still in full force and effect on August 11, 1991, 
when Justin Bell was involved in what was ultimately a fatal 
automobile accident in Los Angeles County, California. The trial 
court's Order, Findings and Summary Judgment should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts clearly show a policy of insurance was issued 
on the same day Phoenix Indemnity received notice that Justin 
Bell's check had been dishonored. This policy contained no 
conditional payment language. As such, the policy could not be 
held void due to dishonor of the premium payment. At several times 
after the initial check was written, Justin Bell had adequate funds 
in his account to cover the premium payment. Any action which 
Phoenix Indemnity chose to take was limited to action on the check, 
not retroactive cancellation of the insurance policy. 
Notwithstanding a valid and binding insurance contract, 
Phoenix Indemnity provided no notice of cancellation until more 
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than a week later on August 7, 1991- Both statutory law and 
Phoenix Indemnity's own policy make it clear that an insurer is 
required to give the insured 10 days' notice of cancellation (plus 
an additional three days for mailing). Phoenix Indemnity failed to 
so comply with these provisions. Phoenix Indemnity's attempt to 
retroactively cancel the policy back to the date of application is 
in violation of Utah Code Ann, § 31A-21-3 03 and therefore, cannot 
be effective. Thus, Justin Bell's policy of insurance was still in 
effect on August 11, 1991, when he was involved in a fatal 
accident. 
For the reasons stated above, appellee urges this court 
to affirm the trial court's ruling that Justin Bell's insurance 
policy was in full force and effect at the time of the subject 
accident. J 
Dated this ^2 ^^day of June, 1994. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




Estate of JUSTIN BELL, 
deceased, by and through 
his Special Administrator, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 910906186 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
BE IT REMEMBERED that the above-entitled case 
came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable 
Timothy R. Hanson, a Judge of the Third Judicial District 
Court of the State of Utah, at Salt Lake City, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah on the 17th day of December, 1993, 
at 2:00 p.m., and that the following proceedings were 
had. 



























A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
Wendell E. Bennett 
Attorney at Law 
448 East 400 South 
Suite 304 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Stuart H. Schultz 
STRONG & HANNI 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
BUNNY C- NEUENSCHWANDER, CSR, RPR 
Page 2 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 December 17, 1993 
3I Partial transcript 
4I THE COURT: Well, I appreciate both of your 
5 J careful analysis. As I read through this in preparation 
6I for this hearing, I — you know, you think you hear it 
7I all, and somebody comes up with something new. And all 
8 1 the years I dealt with insurance policies, I thought I 
9| had a handle on it, but you never do. Nothing new under 
10 1 the sun, or lots of things under the sun, I mean to say. 
Ill I think there's a couple of things that are 
12 J dispositive of this matter, and I certainly am of the 
13I opinion that treatises such as Appleman and other 
14I jurisdictions around the country ought to be carefully 
15 J considered, but you both know they are not necessarily 
16 1 dispositive. The particular facts in this case that are 
17I undisputed, and the language in the application leads me 
18 J to the conclusion that the issuance of the insurance 
19I policy has some substantial effect on how things ought to 
20 J proceed in this case. I cannot read this application to 
211 say that if your check is dishonored, that means there's 
22I not going to be any insurance coverage. And I use that 
23| language broadly, because that's not what it says. It 
24 J says if the premium payment is not honored by the bank, 
25| no coverage will be considered bound. 
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I think the logical reading of that, and if there's 
any question about it, it's pretty clear who it has to be 
attributed against, I think the law is clear on that, it 
has to be attributed against the insurance company. That 
tells me that because I think bound is a term of art in 
the insurance industry that means that we're going to 
have some coverage before the issuance of a policy. And 
while it's not exactly — it's not as clear as it could 
be in this application, it seems to suggest to me that by 
merely submitting the application, you've got some 
insurance coverage unless your check isn't dishonored, or 
we decide not to issue the policy. It doesn't say that, 
but that seems to be the tenor of it. 
The only thing it says about the effect of having a 
check dishonored by the bank is that there would be no 
binding coverage. I don't think there needs to be, nor 
does the term of art in the insurance industry mean that 
it doesn't have any force and effect once the policy is 
issued. Once is the policy is issued, there doesn't need 
to be a binder. So I think the failure of the check to 
clear when presented, and while this — it's not greatly 
significant, it is a consideration that this is not a 
check that was presented, and offered — not presented — 
that's a term of art too, this was not a check written 
out and given to the insurance agent when there was no 
Page 4 
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II money, and never was any money in the bank account. 
2 J Unfortunately for everybody involved, certainly the 
3| estate of Mr, Bell, the check was presented on a day 
4 J there was not enough money to cover it. But in any 
5 J event, I think the fact there was monies in there had 
6 1 some minimal impact, 
7 J The failure of the check to clear only applies to 
8I the binder. I think when the insurance company 
9 J determines — and having notice that the check had not 
10 1 cleared, whether or not the righthand knew what the 
111 lefthand was doing is not Mr, Bellfs concern. When it 
12 J issued the policy, it has to follow the proper procedure 
13 J for cancellation both on the policy, and under State law. 
14 J And that means there has to be ten days notice. Under 
15I that evaluation, the policy was still in effect, because 
16 the time periods had not expired. 
17 I do not believe that the insurance company on one 
18 hand can receive notice of a dishonored check, issue a 
19 policy in any event knowing, or at least should know that 
20 the check had been dishonored, issue a policy, and then 
211 say after the policy is issued, say kings X, we knew 
22 I about the check not being honored, we got it back, but we 
23 1 issued a policy anyway, and we shouldn't have, and 
24 therefore we are retroactively cancelling coverage back 
25 to the date of the application, which also suggests to me 
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1 that there was some insurance coverage in effect before 
2 the policy was issued, all which goes back to the 
3 I original question as to the effect of the language in the 
4 J application that a dishonored check will mean that there 
5 J is no binder. 
6I The insurance company isn't a person that can ' t 
7 1 protect themselves here. As I've already pointed out, an 
8 J insurance company can choose not to issue the policy 
9 1 until the check clears. Or if the check doesnft appear 
10 J in a reasonable time, they can just say we1 re not going 
111 to issue a policy. Look elsewhere. And the insurance 
12 J company is not required to issue a binder if it did in 
13 1 this case. It doesn't have to give any insurance 
14 coverage until it gets its money in its hands. But once 
15 it issued the policy, even though the check may have not 
16 1 cleared before then, I guess that means that they are 
17 satisfied that they are ultimately going to collect on 
18 that check in some fashion, and they choose that to be 
19 1 sufficient consideration to issue the policy. 
20 Once the policy is issued, you've got to cancel in 
211 accordance with the statute. I think the defendant's 
22 motion for Summary Judgment is well taken. I'm going to 
23 1 grant it for the reasons that I've suggested here. To 
24 I the the extent that Appleman or the Tallent cases are 
25 1 contrary, I don't think it ought to be the law in this 
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1 State. The entity that really has the ability to protect 
2 I itself for circumstances like this is the insurance 
3 J company, and no one was twisting their arm to issue the 
4 I policy, but they did. Once they do, they've got to 
5 I cancel it the right way. So the plaintiff's motion for 
6 1 Summary Judgment is denied. The defendant's motion for 
7 1 Summary Judgment is granted. And perhaps we ought to let 
8 I some of the appellate courts review this, and see whether 
9 J or not I'm right or wrong. In any event, until somebody 
10 1 tells me tQ the contrary, that's what I think the law 
111 ought to be. Mr. Schultz, will you prepare an 
12| appropriate order? Include in the order that I'm denying 
13 1 the plaintiff's motion for Summary Judgment. Include in 
14 J the order granting your Summary Judgment the basis for 
15l the decision as I've tried to articulate it here. In 
16 1 part, it's what you have argued, and in part what I have 
17 said, as well as my concept of what insurance coverage 
18 means. So there needs to be a statement in there 
19 pursuant to 52A as to grounds so that it's clear in case 
20 1 someone chooses not to look at the record. 
21 MR. SCHULTZ: Fine. I'll do that. 
22 THE COURT: Clearly the plaintiff's entitled 
23 to the premium. That's — I'm not concerned about that a 
24 this point in time. All right. Thank you, gentlemen. 
25i We'll be in recess. 
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1 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
2 STATE OF UTAH ) 
3 ) ss, 
4 J COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
5 
61 I, BUNNY CAROL NEUENSCHWANDER, do hereby 
7 1 certify: 
8 1 That I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter, 
9 1 License No. 152, and one of the official court reporters 
10 I of the Sta^e of Utah; that on the 17th day of December, 
111 1993, I attended the within matter and reported in 
12 J shorthand the proceedings had thereat; that later I 
13I caused my said shorthand notes to be transcribed into 
14 1 typewriting, and the foregoing pages, numbered from 3 to 
15 1 7, inclusive, constitute a partial transcript, true and 
16 J correct account of the same to the best of my ability. 
17 
18 I Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 6th day of 
19 J January, 1994. 
20 
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Appendix C 
Stuart H. Schultz #2886 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PHOENIX INDEMNITY INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
) ORDER, FINDINGS AND 
Plaintiff, ) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
vs. ) 
Estate Of JUSTIN BELL, ) 
Deceased, by and through ) 
his Special Administrator, ) Civil No. 91096186CN 
Defendant. ) Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
Plaintiff's and defendant's cross-motions for summary 
judgment were heard, pursuant to notice, on December 17, 1993, by 
the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, District Judge. Wendell E. 
Bennett of Wendell E. Bennett & Associates appeared on behalf of 
plaintiff, and Stuart H. Schultz of Strong & Hanni appeared on 
behalf of defendant. The parties, through counsel, presented 
argument to the court. The court having considered the argument 
as well as the memoranda of the parties and the stipulated 
statement of undisputed facts, and the court being advised in the 
premises and good cause appearing, now, therefore; 
«flM8TRICTCGW 
Third JudtoalDfstr/ct 
SALT LAK£ COUNTY 
1 1 2 3 9 2 
2 7 6 4 - 4 9 1 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied, and 
defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted for the 
following reasons: 
(a) Plaintiff actually issued an automobile insurance 
policy in favor of the decedent Justin Bell even though Justin 
Bell's initial premium check did not clear the bank; 
(b) The July 10, 1991, insurance application cannot be 
read to say that there will not be any insurance coverage if 
Justin Bell's premium check is dishonored by the bank. That is 
not what the application says. Instead, it says if the premium 
payment is not honored by the bank, no coverage will be 
considered bound; 
(c) The word "bound" is a term of art in the insurance 
industry. As used in the application signed by Justin Bell, 
"bound" meant that Justin Bell, by merely submitting the 
application, would have some coverage with Phoenix Indemnity 
before issuance of the policy. The failure of the check to clear 
only applied to the effectiveness of coverage under the 
binder/application, but not to coverage under the actual policy 
once it was issued. Any questions regarding the meaning of the 
application must be interpreted against the plaintiff insurance 
company; 
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(d) When Phoenix Indemnity issued the automobile 
insurance policy to Justin Bell on July 29, 1991, there was no 
longer any need for the binder, and Phoenix Indemnity was then 
obligated to comply with the 10-day written notice requirement 
under the policy and under Utah state insurance law before it 
could cancel the policy. Phoenix Indemnity did not comply with 
that 10-day notice requirement for cancellation; 
(e) Phoenix Indemnity received notice on July 29, 
1991, that the premium payment check had been dishonored, but 
nonetheless issued the policy to Justin Bell on that same date 
(July 29, 1991). Phoenix Indemnity cannot issue the policy with 
knowledge that the check has been dishonored and then later 
retroactively cancel coverage back to the date of the original 
application (July 10, 1991). Regardless of whether one 
department of Phoenix Indemnity knew about the dishonor and 
another did not is not Justin Bell's concern; 
(f) Phoenix Indemnity could have adequately protected 
itself against this problem by refusing to issue a policy until 
the premium check had in fact cleared. By issuing the policy, 
even though the check had not cleared, Phoenix Indemnity thereby 
indicated it was satisfied it would ultimately collect on the 
check which was sufficient consideration to issue the policy; 
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(g) To the extent Appleman's treatise on Insurance Law 
and the Tallent case out of Tennessee are contrary to the court's 
decision, the court finds that those sources do not accurately 
reflect the law of the state of Utah; and 
(h) Phoenix Indemnity failed to give 10 days' notice 
of cancellation of the insurance policy it issued to Justin Bell, 
as required under Utah Code Annotated § 31A-21-303 and as 
required under the terms of Phoenix Indemnity's policy where 
cancellation is made for failure to pay premium. As a result, 
the automobile insurance policy issued to Justin Bell was in full 
force and effect on August 11, 1991, the date of the automobile 
accident at issue in this case, and Justin Bell, the estate of 
Justin Bell and the heirs of Justin Bell are entitled to all 
benefits under the policy, including first-party benefits and 
third-party liability benefits, 
2. Pursuant to the foregoing orders and findings, the court 
hereby enters summary judgment in favor of defendant and against 
plaintiff declaring Phoenix Indemnity Insurance Company1s 
insurance policy number DB051602 issued to Justin Bell to be in 
full force and effect on August 11, 1991, the date of the 
accident at issue in this case, and further declaring that 
Phoenix Indemnity Insurance Company is obligated under said 
policy to defend all lawsuits and claims of any kind asserted 
1 1 2 3 9 2 
2 7 < 5 * - 4 9 J L 4 
against Justin Bell and/or the estate of Justin Bell as a result 
of the accident of August 11, 1991, and further declaring that 
Phoenix Indemnity Insurance Company is required to meet all other 
obligations under the policy and Utah's insurance statutes, 
including without limitation, payment of judgments and payment of 
all first-party benefits (including all applicable no-fault 
benefits) provided under the policy. 
3. Judgement is further entered in favor of defendant and 
against plaintiff for interest on all parts of this judgment as 
required by law, including all provisions of Utah's No-Fault Act, 
DATED this / / day of January, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
By 
HdnoPable Timothy R. Hanson 
District Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
/AJJ^JZ/J' T 
Wendell E. Bennett 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1 1 2 3 9 2 
2764—-491 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order, Findings and Summary Judgment was hand delivered 
on January 13, 1994, to the following: 
Wendell E. Bennett 
Wendell E, Bennett & Associates 
448 East 400 South #304 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
^^y^Uy^ 
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Appendix D 
WENDELL E. BENNETT (0287) 
JEANNINE BENNETT (6487) 
WENDELL E. BENNETT & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
448 East 400 South, Suite 304 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7846 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 




Estate of JUSTIN BELL, 
Deceased, by and through his 
Special Administrator, 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. 910906186 CN 
Judge Timothy R. Hansen 
Defendant. 
oooOooo 
1. Notice is hereby given that plaintiff and appellant, 
Phoenix Indemnity Insurance Company, through counsel, Wendell E. 
Bennett and Jeannine Bennett, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the 
final judgment of the Honorable Timothy R. Hansen entered in this 
matter on January 19, 1994. 
2. The appeal is taken from the entire judgment. 
a & 
DATED this 3-" day of January, 1994. 
WENDELL E. BENNETT 





I do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing "Notice of Appeal" to Stuart H. Schultz, Attorney for 
Defendant 600 Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on this 
day of January, 1994. 




APPLICANT (LAST FIRST MlOOLE) 
SrJrfr ' 
3 & S 0 * u J E R W R I T E R S , 4568 South Highland PO BUA 17582 Salt Lake City UT 84117 (801) 272 8685 
P R O C E S S I N G O F F I C E , 2341 West Royal Palm Road PO Box 37550 Phoenix. AZ 85069, (800) 528-0317 
Fax (602) 864-6465 
~ ' | PHONE NO AGENT ~7\ AGENT CCOE NO " 7 1 
ENTS AOORESS ON REVERSE SlOE) AGENTV^OORESS ZIP *" STREcfAOORESS (IF S T U 6 E N T UST PAR l ) RESS <->•-
1OIRECT 8 i a ~ j A G E N C Y 9 I L L j EFFECTIVE DATE ANO TIME ~~ ~~ "/\ / i  
No of Months 
AGENCY BILL 
ANNUAL 3 





CAR #2 IAOORESS 
CAR #3 AOORESS D516Q2 ¥m <&L_ 
DESCRIPTION OF OWNED AUTOMOBILES • ON DIRECT BILL A SEPARATE POLICY WILL BE ISSUED FOR EACH AUTOMOBILE 
PHOTO REQUIRED ON VEHICLES 15 YEARS OLD & OLDER 
CAR YEARMOOEL TRAOG NAME BOOY TYPE/MODEL SERIAL NUMBER/MOTOR NUM8ER IfCKEfe ;HASED MO/YR 
l i / V O O a ^ / ; ,Voa T-p^^a 1 Op-c/^2 ~7^9 
i 
APPUCA* A D E FOR THE UMFFS^rVLIABIUTY AND COVERAGES INDICATED HEREAFTER BY SPECIFIC PREMIUM ENTRIES 
PREMIUMS 




$ 20 000 Each Person 3odtly Injury 
•10 000 Eacn Accdent Bocily Injury 
I 10 000 Each Accident Physical Damage 
I Personal Injury Protecaon 
20 000 Each Person Unnsured Motonst 
JBtt 3 1991 
Personal 
Injury i iiu uuu tacn pers  u s rea i st , r / ^ i i « i ^ * *—t-v r -«-s 1
 40 000 Each Accident Uninsured Motonst H ^ j i ^ f ~ p j £ i j 
EXCESS LIMITS, ABOVE $20/40/10,000 ARE AVAILIBLE 
CONTACT S & S UNDERWRITERS IN Salt Lake City 
(801) 272-8685 (800) 333-8866 
OR 
(800)528-0317 
PROCESSING OFFICE IN PHOENIX 









. £5~or Deductible 
Car Damage 
Colhson 
TOTAL EACH CAR 
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ACCIDENTS. VIOLATIONS ANO CONVICTIONS OF ALL DRIVERS FOR PAST 3 YEARS 
NAME .ACCIDENT, VIOLATIONS OR CONVICTION 
r ^ r t / o ^ W / A ^ - a - f t W l ^ c c / ^ ^ rt&=± 
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QUESTIONS MUST BE ANSWERED BY APPLICANT 
Applicants employer (Include address) 
Occupation/Job Description fO QJ (^~S!L 9 Z 2 7 
Is any vehicle used in business9 3 Yes V N O JUYes, explain in Remarks 
How long has applicant resided in Utah9 Z - 7 / - ^ -£ / /^n e . 
Do we insure all autos in the household9 Q £ sS* 
QQnTQ^ S^Cy OCT 
Who is registered owner of the car(s)9 
Principal Garage l oca t i on? -^ ~7xJSiO / / ^<^>dX 
-R-e-7T~ 
Is any driver physically impaired? 3 Yes JZKNo (if Yes, explain in Remarks. 
Names, age, sex of all children 15 or older living in household. 
v5~?l. ^ L^T^ different from mailing address, show zip code . 
Previous Insurance company and policy number. 






or declined? G Yes ^JNo (If Yes, explain in Remarks.) 
SPECIAL EQUIPMENT MUST BE SHOWN IF COVERAGE IS DESIRED 
Camper 
Mag. Wheels 




Stereo (Maximum $1,000) :$ / 0 O & 
Other Special Equipment (Explain in Remarks) 
APPLICANTS STATEMENT 
CAUTION: DO NOT SIGN UNLESS YOU HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND THE FOLLOWING. 
nderstand that no coverage is bound earlier than the time and date the application is signed. I also understand and agree that 
nay be necessary to adjust the premium and/or the term of my policy to conform to the company's filed rates if any 
ormation on this application is found to be incorrect. I also agree that if my premium payment is not honored by the bank, nc 
yerage will be considered bound. I hereby acknowledge that I received a copy of this application. 
DATE 
outine inquiry may be made regarding your character, general reputation, personal habits and mode of living. However, the 
plication and motor vehicle records are typically all that is used for our underwriting purposes. Upon your written request, we 
I disclose the nature and scope of any investigation. 
PRODUCER'S STATEMENT 
ave fully explained all conditions of this application to the insured and to the best of my knowledge, he/she understands all 
iditions. Further, I have inspected the described vehicle(s) and attest to the fact that there is no existing damage nor are there 
)difications of any kind (if any exceptions, attach supplemental inspection report). I understand and agree that no coverage 
all Sb^ifforded until a fully completed application has been postmarked to S & S Underwriters, Inc., or in accordance with the 
iding rufes-as^putlined to me by S &>ff Underwritersjnc. 
PROpUQER'S SIGNATURE 






A STOCK COMPANY 







WHAT TO DO IN CASE OF ACCIDENT OR LOSS 3 
PARTI LIABILITY-COVERAGE A 5 
Additional Benefits , 5 
Exclusions 6 
Conformity with Financial Responsibility Laws 7 
Limits of Liability 7 
Other Insurance 7 
PARTII MEDICAL PAYMENTS-COVERAGE B . . . . , 8 
Exclusions ,. , . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
Limits of Liability 9 
Other Insurance ^ . . . . . . .• 9 
PART HI UNINSURED MOTORISTS-UNDERINSURED 
MOTORISTS COVERAGE C 
See State Uninsured Motorists-Underinsured Motorists 
PART IV CAR DAMAGE-COVERAGE D 10 
Exclusions 10 
Additional Payments 11 
Loss Payable Clause . . .11 
Limits of Liability • '. 12 
Other Insurance 12 
Arbitration .12 
PARTV GENERAL PROVISIONS , . . . . . . 13 
Policy Period, Territory •. . . . .13 
Changes in Your Policy 13 
Two or More Cars Insured 13 
Action Against Us • 13 
Our Recovery Rights 13 
Transfer of Policy ; . . . . . . . . . .1-* 
Bankruptcy 14 
Cancellation and Non-Renewal 
See State Cancellation, Non-Renewal and Renewal Endorsement 
FAMILY CAR POLICY 
We agree with you, in return for your premium payment, to insure you subject to all.the,terms of this 
policy. 
We will insure you for the coverages for which a premium is shown on your declarations page; 
DEFINITIONS USED THROUGHOUT THISTOLICY 
As used throughout this policy, and shown in bold type: 
We, us and our mean Phoenix Indemnity Insurance Company 
You and your mean the policyholder named on the declarations page(s), and spouseif 
living in the same household. 
Accident means an unexpected or unintentional occurrence resulting from the 
ownership, maintenance or use of a car or utility trailer. 
Bodily injury means bodily harm or death, caused by an accident. 
Property damage means damage to or destruction of property, caused by an accident 
Your insured car means any car described on the declarations page(s), and any 
private passenger car or utility car you replace it with. IF YOU WISH CAR 
DAMAGE COVERAGE TO APPLY TO THE REPLACING CAR, YOU MUST 
NOTIFY US WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DATE YOU OBTAIN THE NEW CAR. 
Your insured car also means any additional private passenger car or utility car of 
which you acquire ownership during the policy period. YOU MUST, HOWEVER, 
NOTIFY US WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DATE YOU OBTAIN THE NEW CAR. 
Your insured car also means any utility trailer you own. 
Private passenger car means a four-wheel vehicle licensed for highway use, and 
designed to be used for personal transportation. 
Relative means a person living in your household, who is related to you by blood, 
marriage or adoption, including a ward or foster child. 
1 
Occupying means being in or On a motor vehicle as a passenger or operator, or being 
engaged in the immediate acts of entering or exiting from a motor vehicle. 
Utility car means a car with a rated load capacity of 1,500 pounds or less of the 
pickup, sedan delivery or panel truck type, if not used for commercial purposes. 
Punitive or Exemplary Damages means any extra or additional sum of money that a 
judge or jury may award as a means of punishing a person for highly objectionable 
behavior involved in the accident. 
Utility trailer means a vehicle designed to be towed by a private passenger car. 
State means any state, territory, or possession of the United States, and any province 
of Canada. COVERAGE PROVIDED BY THIS POUCY DOES NOT APPLY IN 
MEXICO. 
Regular use means use of a vehicle without being required to ask permission each 
time it is used. Regular use also means the use of a vehicle for a continuous period of 
time exceeding 14 days. 
2 
WHATXO.DAJN CASE OFACAR ACCIDENT OR LOSS 
TRERbRTINGA'CLAIlVf ItfejfoaED'S DUTIES 
Notice to Us of an Accident or Loss. 
IF YOU ARE INVOLVED IN AN ACCIDENT OR LOSS, YOU MUST CONTACT YOUR AGENT 
OR: 
Statewide Insurance Corporation 
2341 West Royal Palm Road 
P.O. Box 37550 
Phoenix, Arizona 85069 
602-864-6600 
The report you give us must contain: 
A. your name; 
B. the t&tae$and addressds-of all persons-involved; 
C the hour, date, place and facts of the accident or loss; 
D. the names and addresses of witnesses. 
Notice to Us of Claim or Suit 
If a claim or suit is made against you, you must at once send us every demand, notice or claim made 
and every summons or legal process received. 
Other Duties Under the Car Damage Coverages. 
When there is a loss, you or the owner of the insured car also shall: 
A. make a prompt report to the police when the loss is the result.of theft; 
B. protect the damaged car, we will pay any reasonable expense incurred; 
C. show us the damage, when we ask; 
D. provide all pertinent records, receipts and invoices that we request, or certified copies of 
them; 
E. give us or anyone we designate, statements, including statements under oath, as often as we 
request. 
Other Duties Under Medical Payments, Uninsured Motorists, and Underinsured Motorist Coverages. 
The person making claim also shall: 
A. give us all the details about the death, injury, treatment and any other information we 
request; 
3 
B. be examined by physicians ^ o s c n and paid by usas often as. we require. A copy of the 
report will be sent to the person upon written request.* If the person is no longer 
living or unable to act, his or her legal representative shall authorize us to obtain all 
medical reports and records: 
C give us or anyone we designate, statements, including statements under oath, as often as we 
request. 
Your Duty to Cooperate With Us. 
You shall cooperate with us and, when asked, assist us: 
A. in making settlements; 
B. by securing and giving evidence; 
C by attending and getting witnesses to attend hearings or trials; 
D. by giving us or anyone we designate,.'statements, including statements under oafcb,,as often 
as we request. 
You shall not voluntarily, except at your own cost: 
A. make any payment or assume any obligation to others; or 
B. incur any expense, other than for first aid to others. 
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PART I - LIABILITY 
(Coverage A) 
Wc will pay damages for which any insured person is legally obligated because of bodily Injury or 
property damage resulting from an accident involving the ownership, maintenance or use of an Insured 
car or utility trailer. 
We will defend any suit against an insured person if it seeks damages payable under this policy. We 
may investigate and settle any claim or suit as we think proper. OUR OBLIGATION TO DEFEND A 
SUIT ENDS WHEN THE AMOUNT WE PAY OR OFFER TO PAY EQUALS OUR UMTT OF 
LIABILITY. 
For liability coverage only, insured person or insured persons means you or a relative while using any 
other car with the owner's permissioDL This coverage for non-owned cars does not include those 
furnished for the regular use of you or a relative. 
NO ONE IS AN INSURED PERSON UNLESS USING THE INSURED CAR WITH YOUR 
PERMISSION. 
ADDITIONAL BENEFITS 
In addition to our limit of liability, we will pay the following as respects an insured person. 
We will pay all of our costs in the settlement of any claim. 
We will pay interest on damages awarded in any suit we defend, until we have paid, 
offered to pay, or deposited in court, an amount equal to our liability limit 
We will pay premiums on appeal bonds and attachment bonds required in any suit we 
defend WE WILL NOT PAY ANY PREMIUM FOR ATTACHMENT BONDS 
THAT ARE MORE THAN OUR LIMIT OF LIABILITY. 
We will pay any reasonable expenses an insured person might have for attending 
hearings or a trial at our request because of a lawsuit against that insured person. 
This includes up to $75 a day for lost wages. 
We will pay an insured person's expenses for emergency first aid to others at the 
scene of an accident involving any car we insure. 




Under bodily injury and property damage liability coverages, the following arc NOT covered. 
We do NOT insure any car or utility car while used to cany people or property for a 
fee. This exclusion does not apply to shared expense car pools. 
We do NOT cover bodily injury or property damage caused intentionally by, or at the 
direction of, an insured person. 
We do NOT cover bodily injury or property damage if an insured person is protected 
under a nuclear energy liability insurance policy. This exclusion applies even if the 
limits of that insurance are used up. (A nuclear energy policy covers all people 
involved in a car accident, regardless of who is at fault.) 
We do NOT cover bodily injury to an employee of an insured person, other than a 
domestic employee, arising in the course of employment. 
We do NOT cover bodily injury or property damage arising out of an accident 
involving the operation of the business of servicing, repairing, storing or parking of 
vehicles. However, we will insure a car used in such business, if the car is described 
on the declarations page(s), or is a replacement or substitute car. 
We do NOT cover damage to property owned by or being transported by an Insured 
person. 
We do NOT cover damage to property rented to, or in charge of, an insured person, 
except a residence or private garage. 
We do NOT cover bodily injury or property damage caused by the ownership, 
maintenance or use of any motorized vehicle with less than four wheels. 
We do NOT cover bodily injury or property "damage caused by any motor vehicle if 
not licensed or required to be licensed by the state in which you live. 
We do NOT cover bodily injury or property damage caused by the ownership, 
maintenance or use of any vehicle, other than your insured car, which is owned by, or 
furnished to, or available for regular use to you or a relative. 
We do NOT cover bodily injury or property damage caused by the use of farm 
machinery. 
We do NOT insure any car while used in any racing, demolition or stunting activity. 
We do NOT cover obligations for which the United States Government could be 
liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 
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We do NOT cover punitive or exemplary damages. 
We do NOT cover you for bodily injury which occurs while you are a passenger in the 
insured car. This exclusion does not apply if the law of the state where you live 
specifically prohibits this exclusion. 
We do NOT cover liability assumed by you under any contract or agreement. 
We do NOT cover any car or utility car used in a business, unless you have told us of 
this use before an accident or loss. 
We do NOT cover any bodily injury or property damage after you have sold or 
relinquished ownership of the Insured car. 
CONFORMITY WITH FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY LAWS 
If this policy provides habdity coverage, it will conform to the financial responsibility laws of all states. 
This addiuonal coverage is reduced by any other available insurance. No one will receive duplicate 
payments for. the same loss under this additional coverage. 
LIMITS OF LIABILITY 
The limits of liability shown on the declarations page(s) apply, subject to the following. 
The bodily injury liability limit for each person is the most we will pay for bodily Injury suffered by one 
person, resulting from any one accident. This specifically includes, but is not limited to, all claims for 
damages for care and loss of services 
The bodily injury liability for each occurrence is the most we will pay for bodily Injury suffered by two 
or more people in any one accident 
The property damage liability limit for each occurrence is the most we will pay for all damages to all 
property in any one accident. 
We will pay no more than these maximums regardless of the number of cars described on the 
declarations page(s), insured persons, claims, claimants, policies, cars, or trailers involved in the 
accident 
OTHER INSURANCE 
If an insured person has other insurance that covers a liability loss, we will pay only our share of the 
loss. That share is our proportion of the total liability insurance that applies to the loss. HOWEVER, 
FOR NON-OWNED CARS AND SUBSTITUTE MOTOR VEHICLES, THIS POLICY IS EXCESS 
OVER OTHER COLLECTIBLE INSURANCE. 
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PART II - MEDICAL PAYMENTS 
(Coverage B) 
We will pay reasonable expenses incurred within 1 year from the date of accident for necessary medical 
and funeral expenses because of bodily injury suffered by an insured person. We may pay the injured 
person, or any person or organization performing the services. 
As used in Medical Payments coverage only, insured person or insured persons means you or any 
relative while occupying or having been struck by a highway vehicle or trailer, or any other person while 
occupying your insured car while the car is being used by you, a relative or another person, if that 
person is using or occupying the insured car with your permission. 
EXCLUSIONS 
Under Medicai Payments Coverage, the following situations are NOT covered. 
We do NOT insure any car or utility car while used to carry people or property for a 
fee. This exclusion does not apply to shared expense car pools. 
We do NOT cover an insured person while occupying any vehicle used as a residence 
or premises. 
We do* NOT cover an insured person while occupying a motorized vehiclewith less 
than four wheels. 
We do NOT .cover any insured person while occupying a motorized vehicle not 
licensed or required to be licensed for highway use in the state in which you live. 
We do NOT cover an insured person while occupying, or if struck by any vehicle 
which is owned by, or furnished to, or available for regular use by you or a relative, 
except for your insured car. 
We do NOT cover anyone occupying a car while used in any racing, demolition or 
stunting activity. 
We do NOT cover an insured person while occupying a vehicle other than a private 
passenger car or utility car, if the vehicle is being used in the business or occupation 
of an insured person. 
We do NOT insure for medical care which the United States Government or its 
military services is required to provide to employees, members or dependents. 
We do NOT cover bodily injury caused by war (declared or undeclared), civil war, 
insurrection, rebellion, revolution, nuclear reaction, radiation or radioactive 
contamination, or any consequence of any of these. 
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LIMITS OF LIABILITY 
Regardless of the number of cars we insure under this policy, the limit of medical expense insurance is 
the amount shown on the declarations page for "each person". When medical expenses are payable 
under, more jhan one. policy issued by us, we will not pay more than the highest limit in any one such 
policy. 
OTHER INSURANCE 
If other Medical Payments covers a loss we cover, we will pay only our share of that loss. That share is 
our proportion of the total car Medical Payments insurance that applies to the loss. 
HOWEVER, FOR NON-OWNED AUTOS AND SUBSTITUTE MOTOR VEHICLES, THIS 
POLICY IS EXCESS OVER OTHER COLLECTIBLE CAR MEDICAL PAYMENTS 
INSURANCE. 
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PARTLY CAR DAMAGE 
(COVERAGE D) 
We will pay for direct and accidental loss of or damage to your insured car, including its equipment, 
less any deductible shown on the declarations page(s). The deductible shall apply separately to each 
such loss. 
However, we will pay for loss caused by collision only if the declarations page(s) shows that collision 
coverage (D-I) is afforded. 
Collision means collision of your insured car with another object or animal, or upset of your insured 
car. 
Other than collision means loss to an insured car caused by other accidental loss unless excluded. 
We may pay the loss in money, or repair or replace the damaged or stolen property. Repair cr 
replacement may be made with materials or equipment of the same kind and quality. This means thai 
we may apply depreciation. 
We may, at any time before the loss is paid or the property replaced, return, at our expense, any stolen 
property either to you or to the address shown on the declarations page(s) and we will pay you for, or 
repair, any resulting damage. 
We may keep all or part of the damaged property at the agreed or appraised value. 
EXCLUSIONS 
Under Car Damage Coverage, the following situations are NOT covered. 
We do NOT insure any car or utility car while used to carry people or property for a 
fee. This exclusion does not apply to shared expense car pools. 
We do NOT cover loss caused by war (declared or undeclared), civil war, 
insurrection, rebellion, revolution, nuclear reaction, radiation or radioactive 
contamination, or any consequences of any of these. 
We do NOT cover any camper unit that is designed for mounting on a vehicle, unless 
the unit has been reported to us and a premium charged. 
We do NOT cover any equipment contained in motor homes, camper units or trailers, 
unless it is built in and forms a permanent part of the vehicle, unless you include it in 
the application, or tell us when you add it to the car, and pay a premium for it. 
We do NOT cover special equipment, parts and accessories, unless you listed it in the 
application, or tell us when added to the car, and pay a premium for it. 
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We do NOT cover sound reproducing equipment valued over $350 unless it is original 
equipment or you have told us about this equipment and have paid a premium for it. 
The following are EXAMPLES ot special equipment, parts and accessories we do 
"HOT cover. We do NOT cover chrome, alloy, or magnesium wheels; custom wide 
tread* tires and racing slicks; tape players and stereo radios (unless factory installed as 
original equipment); two-way radios (including CB radios) "and telephones or radio 
telephones; campers and custom enclosures for pickup trucks. 
We do NOT cover custom paint, custom striping, custom body, or custom engine 
work. 
We do NOT consider it a theft when you loan or eive your insured car to someone 
and tiiey do norreturn it. 
We do NOT cover loss resulting from wear and tear, freezing, mechanical or electrical 
breakdown or failure, or road damage to tires. 
We do NOT cover loss to any insured car'due to its being taken by any governmental 
authority. 
We do NOT insure any car while used in any racing,""demolition or stunting* activity. 
We do NOT cover a temporary substitute vehicle. 
We do NOT pay for loss of use of your car or depreciation of your car. 
ADDITIONAL PAYMENTS 
If there is a total theft of your insured car, we will pay up to $10 per day, but no more than $300, for the 
cost of transportation for you. This coverage begins 48 hours after the theft and ends when the car is 
recovered or we offer to pay the loss. You must provide us with proof of your cost of transportation. 
LOSS PAYABLE CLAUSE 
It is agreed that loss or damage under this policy shall be paid to you and the loss payee shown on the 
declarations page(s) or on an endorsement, as interests may appear. 
The insurance covering the interest of the loss pavee shall apply except if invalidated by your fraudulent 
acts or omissions. We have the right, however, to cancel this policy as provided in the policy and the 
cancellation shall terminate this agreement with respect to the loss payee's interest 
When we cancel, we will give at least the same advance notice of cancellation to the loss payee as we 
give to you. 
When we pay any claim to the loss payee we are entitled, to the extent of die payment, to the loss 
payee's rights of recovery 
11 
LIMITS OF LIABILITY 
The actual cash value of the insured car, incluciing its insured equipment damaged at the time of th 
loss, is the most we will pay under this coverage*. If a specific amount is stated on the. declaration 
page(s) or on an endorsement, that is the most we will pay for property to which that limit applies. 1 
the property can be repaired or replaced for less than its actual cash value, the most we will pay is th 
repair or replacement cost. 
OTHER INSURANCE 
If an insured person has other insurance that covers a car damage loss, we will pay only our. share c 
the loss. That share is our proportion of the total car damage insurance that applies to the loss. 
ARBITRATION 
If we do not agree on the amount of loss, you or we may demand an appraisal of the loss. Each of L. 
will appoint an appraiser. The appraisers will select an umpire. If the^  appraisers cannot agree on c. 
umpire within 30 days, the judge *of a court having jurisdiction will appoint the umpire. Each "party w-
pay the expenses it incurs. The expense of the umpire will be shared equally. Each appraiser will stz 
separately the actual cash value and the amount of .loss*. An awards in writing, by any two appraise 
will determine the amount payable. 
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PART V - GENERAL PROVISIONS 
POLICY PERIOD,:TERRItORY 
•Tins policy applies oniyttf accidents? occurrences andlosses"during tne'poucy period'shown''dn'trlfe 
Heclarattons page(s),'while the car is within the OnitecrStates, its territories or possessions,"or Canada, 
dFbcrWen tneir-ports* COVERAGE DOES'NOT APPLY TO ACCIDENTS, OCCURRENCES OR 
LOSSES IN MEXICO. 
CHANGES IN* YOUR'POLICY 
If we adopt-a change ^that"W6uIci broaden •'this policy's coverage without' additional premium, the 
broader coverage will apply to this policy when the change is adopted. 
Policy provisions that conflict with the laws of the state where the policy is issued, will conform with 
those laws. 
No other changes may be made in the policy terms except by written policy endorsement. 
TWO* ORMORE CARS INSURED 
If.thexe^fcanaccidentrbr o<xurrefn<^to-which,.thisandany*othercar policy issued'to you by^us7 applied, 
the total limit of our liability under all the policies will not exceed the highest.applicable limit of-liability 
under any one policy. 
ACTION AGAINST US: 
You have no grounds for anv action against us until you have complied with all policy provisions.. 
For liability coverage, no action may oe brought against us until the insured person's legal liability has 
been finally decided. No one has the right to make us a party to an action against an insured person to 
decide his liability. 
For car damage coverage, no action may be brought against us until 30 days after proof of loss is filed 
and the amount of loss is decided. 
OUR RECOVERY RIGHTS 
After we have made payment under the liability, personal injury protection, medical expense, 
uninsured motorists, underinsured motorists or car damage insurance of this policy, we have the right 
to recover the payment from anyone who may be held responsible. You and anyone we protect must 
sign any papers and do whatever else is necessary to transfer this right to us and assist us in the effort to 




Interest in this policy may not be transferred to any person ©reorganization witnout our written consent." 
"However, if you die," the policy will cbvcr~your survivor or your legal representative, while acting within 
the" scope of duties of a legal representative or any person having proper custody of your Insured .car 
until a legal representative is appointed 
BANKRUPTCY 
We are not relieved of any obligation under this policy because of the banJcniptcy or insolvency of any 
Insured person. 
This policy is signed at Phoenix, Arizona; o'n behalf of Phoenix Indemnity Insurance Company by our 
President and Secretary. It is countersigned on the declarations page: by our authorized representative! 
Kenneth C Coon, Jr., President George P. Mang, Secretary 
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THIS ENDORSEMENT IS SUBJECT TO A LL OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE POLICY EXCEPT AS 
MODIFIED HEREIN 
UTAH CANCELLATION 
We may cancel this policy by mailing notice of cancellation to you at least 30 days before the cancellation takes 
effect. Our cancellation must be by certified or first class mail. 
If notice is mailed within the first 60 days the policy is in effect, and this is not a renewal policy, or if cancellation is 
for nonpayment of premium, we will provide you at least 10 days notice. 
After this policy is in effect for 60 days, or if this is a renewal or continuation policy, we will cancel only: 
(a) for nonpayment of premium; 
(b) if your driver's license or that of any driver who lives with you or any driver who 
customarily drives your insured car has been suspended or revoked. This suspension or 
revocation must have occurred during the policy period or since the last anniversary, if 
the original effective date of the policy period is other than 1 year. 
Non-renewal. If we decide not to renew or continue this policy, we will mail notice to you at the address shown in 
the Declarations ^Hae of this policy. 
Notice will be delivered or sent by first class mail at least 30 days before the end of the policy period. If the policy 
period is other than 1 year, we will have the right not to renew or continue it only at each anniversary of its 
original effective date. 
Automatic Termination. If we offer to renew or continue and you or your representative do not accept, this policy 
will automatically terminate at the end of the current policy period. Failure to pay the required renewal or 
continuation premium when due shall mean that you have not accepted our offer. 
If you obtain other insurance on your insured car, any similar insurance provided by this policy will terminate as 
to that car on the effective date of the other insurance. 
Other Termination Provisions. 
(a) We may deliver any notice instead of mailing it. Proof of first class mailing of any notice 
shall be sufficient proof of notice. 
(b) If this policy is cancelled, you may be entitled to a premium refund. If so, we will send 
you the refund. The premium refund, if any, will be computed according to our manuals. 
However, making or offering to make the refund is not a condition of cancellation. 
(c) The effective date of cancellation stated in the notice shall become the end of the policy 
period. 
THIS ENDORSEMENT IS SUBJECT TO ALL OF THE PROVISIONS OF 
THE POLICY EXCEPT AS MODIFIED HEREIN 
UTAH 
PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION 
PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE 
We will pay personal injury protection benefits to or on behalf of each eligible injured person for: 
(a) medical expenses, 
(b) work loss, 
(c) funeral expenses, and 
(d) survivor loss 
resulting from bodily injury sustained by an eligible injured person caused by an accident involving the use of a 
motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. 
Exclusions 
This coverage does not apply to bodily injury: 
(a) sustained by any person while occupying a motor vehicle which is owned by you and 
which is not insured under this policy; 
(b) sustained by any person while operating the insured motor vehicle without your consent; 
(c) sustained while not in lawful possession of the insured motor vehicle; 
(d) sustained by any person, if such person's conduct contributed to his/her injury under 
either of the following circumstances: 
(i) by causing injury to himself/herself intentionally; or 
(ii) while committing a felony. 
(e) sustained by any person while using the motor vehicle as a residence or premises; 
(f) sustained by any person for any injury due to war, whether declared or not, civil war, 
insurrection, rebellion or revolution; 
(g) sustained by any person for any injury resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or 
other hazardous properties of nuclear materials. 
Definitions 
When used in reference to personal injury protection coverage, the following definitions apply: 
"Bodily injury" means bodily harm, including death resulting from an accident 
"Eligible injured person" means: 
(a) you or any relative who sustains bodily injury caused by an accident involving the use of 
any insured motor vehicle; 
(b) any other person who sustains bodily injury caused by an accident while: 
(i) occupying the insured motor vehicle with your consent; or 
(ii) a pedestrian if the accident involves the use of the insured motor 
vehicle. 
"Funeral expenses" means funeral, burial or cremation expenses incurred. 
"Insured" means the named insured, the spouse or other relative of the named insured who resides in the same 
household of the named insured, including those who usually make their home in the same household but 
temporarily live elsewhere, or any person using the insured motor vehicle with your permission. 
"Insured motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle for which: 
(a) the bodily injury liability insurance of the policy applies and for which a specific premium 
is charged; and 
(b) the named insured is required to maintain security under the provisions of the Utah 
Automobile Financial Responsibility of Motor Vehicle Owners and Operators Act 
"Medical expenses" means the reasonable expenses incurred for necessary medical, surgical, x-ray, dental and 
rehabilitation services, including prosthetic devices, necessary ambulance, hospital and nursing services, and any 
non-medical remedial care and treatment rendered in accordance with a recognized religious method of healing. 
However, it does NOT include expenses in excess of those for a semi-private room, unless more intensive care is 
medically required. 
"Motor vehicle" means every self-propelled vehicle which is designed for use upon a highway. IT DOES NOT 
MEAN: 
(a) A VEHICLE OPERATED ON RAILS OR CRAWLER TREADS, A FARM TYPE 
TRACTOR, TRACTION ENGINES, ROAD ROLLERS, TRACTOR CRANES, 
POWER SHOVELS OR WELL DRILLERS; 
(b) EQUIPMENT DESIGNED FOR USE PRINCIPALLY OFF PUBLIC ROADS; 
(c) VEHICLES WHICH ARE PROPELLED BY ELECTRIC POWER OBTAINED 
FROM OVERHEAD WIRES BUT NOT OPERATCD UPON RAILS; OR 
(d) MOTORCYCLES, trailers and semitrailers. 
"Named insured" means the person named in the declarations. 
"Occupying" means being in or upon a motor vehicle as a passenger or operator or engaged in the immediate act 
of entering, boarding or alighting from a motor vehicle. 
"Pedestrian" means any person not occupying a motor vehicle. 
"Relative" means a spouse or any other person related to the named insured by blood, marriage or adoption 
(including a ward or foster child) or guardianship who is a resident of the same household. Relative includes 
those who usually make their home in the same household but temporarily live elsewhere. 
"Survivor loss" means compensation because of the death of the eligible covered person. 
"Work loss" means: 
(a) loss of income and loss of earning capacity by the eligible lr\jured person during his/her 
lifetime, from inability to work during a period commencing three days after the date of 
the bodily injury and continuing for a maximum of 52 consecutive weeks thereafter, 
provided that if such eligible injured person's inability to work shall continue for a 
period in excess of two consecutive weeks after the date of the bodily injury, this three 
day elimination period shall not be applicable; and 
(b) an allowance for services actually rendered or expenses reasonably incurred that, except 
for the bodily injury, the eligible injured person would have performed during his/her 
lifetime for his/her household commencing three days after the date of the bodily injury 
and continuing for a maximum of 365 consecutive days thereafter, provided that if such 
eligible injured person's inability to perform such services shall continue for a period in 
excess of 14 consecutive days after the date of the bodily Injury, this three day 
elimination period shall not be applicable. 
Policy Period; Territory 
This coverage applies only to accidents which occur during the policy period and within the United States of 
America, its territories or possessions or Canada. 
Limits of Liability 
Regardless of the number of persons insured, policies or bonds applicable, claims made, or insured motor vehicles 
to which this coverage applies, our liability for personal injury protection benefits with respect to bodily injury 
sustained by any one eligible injured person in any one motor vehicle accident, is limited as follows: 
(a) the maximum amount payable for medical expenses shall not exceed $3,000; 
(b) the maximum amount payable for work loss is: 
(i) eighty-five percent of any loss of gross income and earning capacity, not 
to exceed the total of $250 per week; 
(ii) $20 per day for inability to perform services for his/her household; 
(c) the maximum amount payable for funeral expenses shall not exceed $1,500 per person; 
(d) the amount payable for survivor loss is $3,000 and is payable only to persons who are the 
eligible injured person's natural heirs; 
(e) any amount payable by us under the terms of this coverage shall be reduced by the 
amount paid, payable, or acquired to be provided on account of such bodily injury: 
(i) under any workmen's compensation plan or any similar statutory plan; 
or 
(ii) by the United States or any of its agencies because of his/her being on 
active duty in the military services. 
OTHER INSURANCE 
No eligible ir\jured person shall recover duplicate benefits for the same elements of loss under this or any similar 
insurance. 
If an eligible injured person who is a named insured, a relative, or person who is injured in an accident involving 
the use of an insured motor vehicle, has other similar insurance applicable to the accident, the maximum recovery 
under all such insurance shall not exceed the amount which would have been payable under the provisions of the 
insurance providing the highest dollar limit We shall not be liable for a greater proportion of any loss to which 
this coverage applies than the limit of liability hereunder bears to the sum ppnof the applicable limits of liability of 
this coverage and such other insurance. 
If an eligible insured is also an insured under any other policy, primary coverage is given by the policy insuring the 
motor vehicle in use during the accident 
REIMBURSEMENT BETWEEN INSURERS 
If you are held legally liable for personal injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits under Personal Injury 
Protection have been paid by another insurer, the insurer of the person who is held legally liable shall reimburse 
the other insurer for payments they have made. Reimbursement shall not be in excess of the amount of damages 
receivable. 
The term "another insurer" shall include the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah-
The issues of liability and damages shall be decided through mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers. 
THIS ENDOR ^ INT IS SUBJECT TO ALL OF ")ROVISIONS 
OF THE" rOLICY EXCEPT AS MODIFIED J0OEREIN 
UTAH 
PART m - UNINSURED MOTORISTS/INSURED CAR 
REPORTING A CLAIM - INSURED'S DUTIES 
You must report an accident to the police within 24 hours and to us within 
10 days. 
You must let us see the insured car damaged in the accident. 
You must immediately send us a copy of all suit papers if the insured sues 
the party liable for the accident for damages. 
If making a claim for car damages, you must give us sworn proof of claim as 
soon as possible. This proof must state: 
A. Who owns the insured car and how much of it they own; 
B. The value of the insured car at the time of the accident; 
C. The amount of any claims or liens .against the insured car; 
D. Details of the accident and of any other insurance covering 
the insured car. 
E. The name of the owner or operator or the license plate number 
of the uninsured motor vehicle; 
After notice of claim you must do what is necessary to preserve our right 
to recover damages from any person or organization claimed to be 
responsible for the damage. 
COVERAGE C 
We will pay damages for the insured car which the insured is legally 
entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor 
vehicle. The damage must be caused by an accident and arise out of the 
ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured motor vehicle. The 
uninsured motor vehicle causing the damage must make actual physical 
contact with your insured car. 
We will determinef with the insured or the insured/s legal representative, 
if there is a legal right to recover damages, and the amount of damages. 
If agreement cannot be reached, it will be decided through arbitration. 
If suit is brought to decide legal liability or damages without our written 
consent, we are not bound by any resulting judgment. 
As used in uninsured motorists coverage only, motor vehicle means a land 
motor vehicle or trailer, but DOES NOT MEAN A VEHICLE OPERATED ON RAILS OR 
CRAWLER TREADS, A FARM TYPE TRACTOR, EQUIPMENT DESIGNED FOR USE PRINCIPALLY 
OFF PUBLIC ROADS, OR A VEHICLE USED AS A RESIDENCE. 
Uninsured motor vehicle means a motor vehicle which is not insured by a 
property damage liability policy or bond at the time of accident. 
Any coverage under this part shall be subject to a $250 deductible. 
Maximum amount of coverage for any insured car shall be $3,500, cost of 
repair, or actual cash value, whichever is less. 
There shall be no coverage provided for loss of use of the insured car. 
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is the authorized representative of the above named company with the 
authority to effect this cancellation/non-renewal. 
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A U T 0 * G 3 I L ! POLICYNO. D 3 D 5 1 6 G 2 
r ~i 
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STATEWIDE INSURANCE COS?, 
?. C. '30X 375 50 
PHOENIX/ A 2 w SS:*? 
1_ 






IF YOO WISH-TO REWRITE COVERAGE PLEASE SEND 





 3 E L L * J L ' S T I : : 
to 2 ? 3 S O U T H 1 1 C : V.EST 
S A L T L A K E C I T Y UT 3 ^ 1 0 + 
l_ J 
THIS RECEIPT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR INDEMNIFICATION 
Postmaster 
Authorized Representative 
CERTIFICATE TO BE FILLED IN WHEN NOTICE IS MAILED 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have served the original of the above notice 
upon the assured by depositing it in the POST OFFICE at 
P H O E N I X / A 3 I Z C 4 A 
Signed. Mary •—CjdiCvsllaLiwii DcpL« 
Q 
You are hereby notified in accordance with the terms and conditions of the above mentioned policy that your insurance will cease at and fromj 
yj the hour and date mentioned above. 
If the premium has been paid, premium adjustment will be made as soon as practicable after cancellation becomes effective. 
If the premium has not been paid, a bill for the premium earned to the time of cancellation will be forwarded in due course. 
• 
You are hereby notified in accordance with the terms and conditions of the above mentioned policy, and in accordance with the law, that the 
above mentioned policy will expire effective at and from the hour and date mentioned above and the policy will NOT be renewed. 
a Automobile Insurance Plan Information: You have been notified herewith that this Company does not desire to carry your automobile insurance any longer. You are possibly eligible for automobile insurance through another insurer or under the California Automobile Assigned Risk Insurance Plan. 
Additional information Regarding the Reason(s) for CanceUation/Nonrenewal: You have the right to know the specific items of information 
that support the reasons given for this decision and the identity of the source of that information. You also have the right to see and obtain copies 
of documents relating to this decision. 
If you ask us to correct, amend, or delete any information about you in our files and if we refuse to do so, you have the right to give us a concise 
statement of what you believe is the correct information. We will put your statement in our file so that anyone reviewing your file will see it. 
If you would like additional information concerning this action, state law requires that you submit a written request within ninety (90) business 
days of the date this notice was mailed to you. 
•
You have the right to complain of the insurer's action and the stated reason for such action within ten (10) days of receipt of notice, to the 
Director of Insurance. Be also notified of your possible eligibility for insurance through the Auto Assigned Risk Plan, per Arizona code 20-25901. 
Appendix H 
LoP "DbDll^ i^ 
r
--vTF T:"''' {j 
POLICY HOLDER/NANED INSURED PRODUCER 
3 ^ - L , JLSTi ru LYOMS .JC ASSOC 8 0 1 - 2 6 3 - O K 
27S SOU • .-1 i.100 v*ic.S7 
SAi_7 cAKE CITY uT 3 4 1 0 4 5 3 ^ 9 3 STATE ST i'ri U76-
SALT L A «•'•£. CITY • j r 8>. J.v7 
POLICY TERi^. FRCtt 4 J 2 0 PK OiN 0 7 / 1 0 / 9 1 TG 0 9 / 1 1 / 9 1 AT i 2 : o l Af t . OAVS: .6." 
3 - PRErUL^: , THE Ai'iGLN f S T A T L D I S THE PREMIUM FDR TriES '-'GLlCY V£,V. . 
1 Ai?. I L I 7Y 
. BGDIL-V INJ U R Y T O O T H E R S S 20.000.00 EAC.-<. P E R S O N ** 53, 
%V> 40 ,000 - 00 EACH ACC I DEN1" L NCL;-I 
. PROPERTY DAMAGE TO OTHERS S 10 .,000. 00 EACH ACC I DEM 7 :* 'jb, 
E D I C A L PAYMENTS - REFER TO PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION ENDORSEMENT. 
-.INSURED MOTORISTS - BODILY INJURY .5 20,000.00 EACH PERSON 
£ 3 0 , O'>0 „ 00 c A C r A C C I vE:M 1" ;. ^ iC :_*... •' 
z. R S 0 N A L i N ^ J U R V P R 0 f E C •*" IL;r*! (NL •_. J *! 
-"\R DAMAGE/DAMAGE TO YGu'R AUTO BASED ON ACTUAi.. CASH VAi-UE- : ACV . 
LLLfc-I S* Ui'i ( A C V \ LEE::' '•$• 2*L4v - 'J'j L'LD'.JC i iiT-i..:.". £ :"•::•>, 
- 0 7J-.ER Tr-.Ar; C O * - L . I S I G J V (ACV) ;_ESS s 230.00 OEDuCTIS^E -3 i CJ 
•:G- SY>iBG«_ 10 DRIVER LEV, 3 T H I S C A P :-'REivllUM '& 'i. &•••*. 
TERR. Oi POINTS 04 
4. DESCRIPTION OP CAR/AUTG -
?50 SAAB <?G0 TURBO ID# 90S0IO27539 
S« .-.OSS r'Av'EE 
RSEriENTS tfADE A PART OF THIS POLICY: U7-I, UT-2, UT-3 
6. THESE DECLARATIONS ARE PART OF YOUR POLICY-THERE'S/* 
3E READ YOUR POLICY FOR FUL.L CONDITIONS, 
AUG I 1991 
3A7E OF ISSUE 07/29/91 N 
L U U N T L R S I bNED 
Appendix I 
ant-sz4—tsso 
JU8TIN L B L L L f 
27S SOUTH 1100 WEST 
SrtiT LA*t CITV .UP •: 
. .ftMVCC • 
NO OtH|t^.HAtO*S 




THiS STATIMINT • • 
: 2-8E 













;. AMOUNT TRAHS&CTXGH DESCRZfTZQN- .-. . 
1,200.00* ATM TRANS CHKTO.CHK 2I0NS FNB 310 SOUTH 
• MAIN SALT LAKE CV UT • -. • 
. ' 40,00 ATM W/D FROfj CHK 2I0NS FNB 701 EAST -40CS0 
SALT LAKE CY UT V ...••" 
.12.00 NSF HANDLING CHARGE ..'•.-
•. 164.00* CHECK POSTED BUT RETURNED -t- " 
" 173.13«\ DEPOSIT •• " • . / 
! ,'200.00* ATM"TRANS CHK TO CHK 2I0N3 FNB 310 SOUTH 
miti SALT LAKE CY UT 
2S.0Q -NSF HANDLING CHARGE 
JCS.CC* CtiECK POSTED SOT RETURNED 
92.00* CHECK POSTED BUT RETURNED * ' 
tOO.OO* ATM TRANS CHK TO CHK 2I0NS FNB ZitS SOUTH 
MAIN SALT-LAKE CV UT 
13.00 NSF HANDLING CHARGE 
200.00+ CHECK POSTED BUT RETURNED 
5.73 SERVICE CHARGE • '; CHECKS PROCESSED' 
SATE:.CHECK NO,;... 
07/29 ., .-v ,;..-; ; 
0CVJ8 •;..-• v i n * ; 
07^19 V; 112 -
or/i?;;.;; 113 . • 
07/16^.//: t:i4:'•••..•: 
o?*t2 >'.:••' ••• .us :V-• 
07/ts ;:; its..." 
0 7 / 1 5 - V - 1 1 7 V 
0 7 / 1 2 ^ r 1f3 
0 7 / 1 5 r , . 113. . , 
X&siSr 120 
P7/15 121 
0 7 / 1 5 122 V 
07 /23 123 
07 /25 • 125* 
} * • INDICATE3 A SKIP 
IDAILV BALANCE SUMMAR' 




- 50.00 . 
564.00 . 
•; •• 22.OQ 
•..•-. 29,9V 






. . 194.83 





. DHTE. .CHECK NG.. ^;AMOUNT 
07/29 . ;: ; 126 ; " ISO.00 
03/01 • "•• ...> 127 : .* —-UHJ.DQ 
OS/02 \ •;•• \ 128. 200.00J 
OB/02. •: : t29 • . .32.00l 
OQ/06".>-••:•" 130 ' .; : 200.00 
06/01 -V . 131 . • •• 8.60 
07/31 :' •* •. 132 . 46.00 
07/31 "• .133 . * : 45.49 
07/31/ . . 134 V 23.16 
08/01 •."'•• 135 * 500.00 
03/02. 138*. 100.00 
08/07. 136* J 00". 00 
08/02 •* 137 * : 100.00 
08/08 .. .140*. 20.00 
CHECK NUMBERS . 
c w /!/ 
. BALANCE DATE BALANCE 
154.15 07/16 • 512.24 




























278 SOUTH MOO WEST ' . 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84104-1230 
A C f / j ^ r N u M | i k 
08/12/31 
.Qt»«»C»U»Gtl AMY K , * * f » 
„.. BALANCE:. /DATE. 
:•:/. 283.37: 07/31 
/'. 190.80 • 08/01 
:.- 30.80 08/02 
.1,290.80 : 08/05* 










 YCU CAN LOWER THE SERVICE* CHARGE CN YOUR SPECIAL CHECKING 
ACCOUNr BV USING A 2I0NS 5 A ^ VISA BANKING CARD OH ANY 
• >0P THE flANY REDDI-ACCESS .'AirrCflATIC TELLER. MACHINES IN 
. PLACE OF WRIT2MS A CHECK. 
